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Power Dynamics War Crimes

Dear Blairite MP,

Dear Ms Rachel Squire,

The record shows that you have consistently supported the government on matters of war. In my humble opinion, all recent military interventions have directly inflicted death and destruction and sown the seeds of more interethnic violence. I doubt you have time to investigate the complex history of foreign involvement in civil wars still raging or simmering in Afghanistan and the Balkans, so let us consider the government's stated aims and its true motivations behind the recent invasion of Iraq, which you supported wholeheartedly.

So far, five reasons have been given to justify an expenditure of $120 billion, money - I hasten to add - that could work wonders if invested in sustainable development in the world's poorest countries. All prove fallacious under closer scrutiny.

  1. The pre-invasion Iraqi regime had weapons of mass destruction. We now know it did not, but any chemical and biological weapons it might have had were remnants of stock supplied in the 1980s when Ronald Reagan's and George Bush Senior's administrations, under which many members of George W Bush's cabinet worked, had friendly relations with the Baathist Regime. Key evidence publicised by the mass media, in particular, the Sun and Daily Record read by many traditional Labour voters here in Scotland, proved to be based on false evidence.
  2. Saddam Hussein collaborated with Al Qaeda. Utter nonsense, not a shred of evidence. The only real link between the two is that the US government supported them in previous guises in the 1980s.
  3. We need to impose democracy on the region by overthrowing a brutal dictator. That Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator is beyond dispute. But he would never have gained power without US support. More important, by democracy the US administration clearly means compliance with the dictat of unaccountable multinationals. Most of Iraqi industry has already been privatised and the oil ministry will continue to work under the watchful guidance of US-based oil corporations and be required to pay off debts that date from the 1980s war with Iran.
  4. By removing an inimical regime, the world will be a safer place. Clearly fallacious, no-one outside a small pro-US or pro-Israeli elite seriously believes Iraqis will have any effective control after the staged handover of power on 30th June. The newly appointed prime minister Iyad Allawi is a former CIA and MI6 asset (very much like Saddam Hussein).
  5. Iraqis will benefit from greater economic prosperity. Actually, despite the war with Iran and despite the regime's undeniably repressive nature, the 1980s marked the heyday of the Iraqi economy as a sizeable proportion of oil revenue filtered back into the economy. The 1990s witnessed a collapse in oil exports (to less than 1/4 of the previous level) and a harsh sanctions regime, that both Denis Halliday and Hans von Sponeck have described as genocidal.

Yet while Labour MPs such as yourself fell victim to a campaign of deception, the world is experiencing another crisis, much bigger and more dramatic in scale than the threat posed by any dictator of a medium-sized nation. In one word, OIL. Our economy depends on material growth, which is rapidly outstripping supply. Recent price rises are but a foretaste of things to come. We'd need hundreds of thousands of wind turbines blighting our landscape to substitute a sizeable fraction of the energy we get from fossil fuels. Other alternatives such as nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, biomass, biodiesel etc. all have their limitations. Hydrogen is but a carrier requiring electricity for electrolysis from water or fossil fuels. Cold fusion is at best 30-40 years from the making and at worst a myth that contradicts the laws of thermodynamics.

In short control of the world's last plentiful and cheap supply of fossil fuels in Iraq and neighbouring Saudi Arabia and Iran plays a pivotal role in the continued supremacy of a world order centred around US multinationals. The evidence linking leading members of Bush regime to the oil industry is compelling. The Project for a New American Century urged the occupation of Iraq back in the mid 1990s. Indeed it has long been their intention to create a situation, in which the US could justify a permanent presence in the region. IN this context one understands much more lucidly the role played by the infamous Saddam Hussein. First they armed his regime, next they tricked him into invading Kuwait, then they imposed sanctions against his people while ensuring his regime stayed in intact and lastly they occupied his country less than two years after a terrorist attack on the US. Without Saddam Hussein none of this would have been possible.

It seems blatantly clear to me that the last thing the corporate powers behind Tony Blair's leadership want in Iraq is for the people of the Middle East to control their own destiny. Thanks to your vote, millions more will die in a long and protracted war that will dwarf the US misadventure in Vietnam. More to the point the real reasons for this war, greed and control, go against everything the Labour movement has ever stood for.

I invite you to justify your stance and debate the issue at a time and place of your choosing.

Write to your MP:

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After Pinkville

On 15 October 1965, an estimated 70,000 people took part in large-scale anti-war demonstrations. The demonstrators heard pleas for an end to the bombing of North Vietnam and for a serious commitment to negotiations, in response to the negotiation offers from North Vietnam and UN efforts to settle the war. To be more precise, this is what they heard if they heard anything at all. On the Boston Common, for example, they heard not a word from the speakers, who were drowned out by hecklers and counter-demonstrators.

On the Senate floor, Senator Mansfield denounced the ‘sense of utter irresponsibilityÂ' shown by the demonstrators, while Everett Dirksen said the demonstrations were ‘enough to make any person loyal to his country weepÂ'. Richard Nixon wrote, in a letter to the New York Times, that ‘... victory for the Viet Cong... would mean ultimately the destruction of freedom of speech for all men for all time not only in Asia, but in the United States as wellÂ' - nothing less.

In a sense, Senator Mansfield was right in speaking of the sense of utter irresponsibility shown by demonstrators. They should have been demanding not an end to the bombing of North Vietnam and negotiations, but a complete and immediate withdrawal of all American troops and matériel - an end to any forceful interference in the internal affairs of Vietnam or any other nation. They should have been demanding not merely that the US adhere to international law and its own treaty obligations - thus removing itself forthwith from Vietnam; but they should also have exercised their right and duty to resist the violence of the state, which was as vicious in practice as it was illegal in principle.

In October 1967 there were, once again, mass demonstrations {29} against the war, this time in Washington and at the Pentagon. A few months earlier, still larger, though less militant, demonstrations had taken place in New York. The Tet offensive, shortly after, revealed that American military strategy was ‘foolish to the point of insanityÂ'.1 It also revealed to the public that government propaganda was either an illusion or a fraud. Moreover, an international monetary crisis threatened, attributable in part to Vietnam.

In retrospect, it seems possible that the war could have been ended if popular pressure had been maintained. But many radicals felt that the war was over, that it had become, in any case, a ‘liberal issueÂ', and they turned to other concerns. Those who had demanded no more than an end to the bombing of North Vietnam and a commitment to negotiations saw their demands being realized, and lapsed into silence.

These demands, however, had always been beside the point. As to negotiations, there is, in fact, very little to negotiate. As long as an American army of occupation remains in Vietnam, the war will continue. Withdrawal of American troops must be a unilateral act, as the invasion of Vietnam by the American government was a unilateral act in the first place. Those who had been calling for ‘negotiations nowÂ' were deluding themselves and others, just as those who now call for a cease-fire that will leave an American expeditionary force in Vietnam are not facing reality.

As to the bombing of North Vietnam, this had always been a side-show, in large measure a propaganda cover for the American invasion of the South. The US government could not admit that it was invading South Vietnam to protect from its own population a government that we had installed. Therefore it was rescuing the South Vietnamese from ‘aggressionÂ'. But then surely it must strike at the ‘source of aggressionÂ'. Hence the bombing of North Vietnam. This, at least, seems the most rational explanation for the bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965, at a time when no North Vietnamese troops were in the South, so far as was known, and there was a bare trickle of supplies.

To be sure, those who are ‘in the knowÂ' have different explanations {30} for the bombing of North Vietnam. Consider, for example, the explanation offered by Sir Robert Thompson, the British counter-insurgency expert who has been for many years a close adviser of the American army in South Vietnam - a man who is, incidentally, much admired by American social scientists who like to consider themselves ‘tough minded, hard-nosed realistsÂ', no doubt because of his utter contempt for democracy and his relatively pure colonialist attitudes. In the Guardian of 19 May 1969, his views are explained as follows:

He also condemns the bombing of the North. The US Air Force in 1965 was having great budgetary problems, because the army was the only one that had a war on its hands and was thus getting all the money. ‘So the Air Force had to get in, and you had the bombing of North Vietnam ... the budgetary problems of the Air Force were then solved.Â'

In his No Exit From Vietnam (1969), he explains more graphically the attractiveness of air power:

One can so easily imagine the commander of the Strategic Air Command striding up and down his operations room wondering how he could get in on the act. With all that power available and an enormous investment doing nothing, it is not surprising that reasons and means had to be found for their engagement. The war was therefore waged in a manner which enabled this massive air armada to be used round the clock. ... In this way the war could be fought as an American war without the previous frustrations of cooperating with the Vietnamese.

Or consider the explanation for the bombing of the North offered by Adam Yarmolinsky, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1965-6, previously Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. According to his analysis, the strategic bombing of North Vietnam ‘produced no military advantages except for its putative favourable impact on morale in the south. But [this step] was taken, at least in part, because it was one of the things that the US military forces were best prepared to do.Â'2

So North Vietnam was flattened and impelled to send troops to {31} the South, as it did a few months after the bombing began, if the Department of Defense can be believed.

Since the bombing of North Vietnam ‘produced no military advantagesÂ' and was extremely costly, it could be stopped with little difficulty and little effect on the American war in South Vietnam. And so it was, in two steps: on 1 April 1968, when the regular bombing was restricted to the southern part of North Vietnam, and on 1 November, when it was halted. At the same time, the total American bombing, now restricted to Laos and South Vietnam, was increased in April and increased again in November. By March 1969 the total level of bombardment had reached 130,000 tons a month - nearly two Hiroshimas a week in South Vietnam and Laos, defenceless countries. And Melvin LairdÂ's projection for the next twelve to eighteen months was the same.3 The redistribution (and intensification) of bombing and the largely empty negotiations stilled domestic protest for a time and permitted the war to go on as before.

We can now look back over the failure of the ‘peace movementÂ' to sustain and intensify its protest over the past four years. By now, defoliation has been carried out over an area the size of Massachusetts, with what effect no one has any real idea. The bombardment of Vietnam far exceeds the bombardment of Korea or anything in the Second World War. The number of Vietnamese killed or driven from their homes cannot be seriously estimated.

It is important to understand that the massacre of the rural population of Vietnam and their forced evacuation is not an accidental by-product of the war. Rather it is of the very essence of American strategy. The theory behind it has been explained with great clarity and explicitness, for example by Professor Samuel Huntington, Chairman of the Government Department at Harvard and at the time (1968) Chairman of the Council on Vietnamese Studies of the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, ultimately responsible to the State Department. Writing in Foreign Affairs, he explains that the Viet Cong is ‘a powerful force which cannot be dislodged from its constituency {32} so long as the constituency continues to existÂ'. The conclusion is obvious, and he does not shrink from it. ‘We can ensure that the constituency ceases to exist by “direct application of mechanical and conventional power”... on such a massive scale as to produce a massive migration from countryside to cityÂ', where the Viet Cong constituency - the rural population - can, it is hoped, be controlled in refugee camps and suburban slums around Saigon.

Technically, the process is known as ‘urbanizationÂ' or ‘modernizationÂ'. It is described, with the proper contempt, by Daniel Ellsberg, a Department of Defense consultant on pacification in South Vietnam, who concludes, from his extensive on-the-spot observations, that ‘we have, of course, demolished the society of VietnamÂ', that ‘the bombing of the South has gone on long enough to disrupt the society of South Vietnam enormously and probably permanentlyÂ'; he speaks of the ‘people who have been driven to Saigon by what Huntington regards as our “modernizing instruments” in Vietnam, bombs and artilleryÂ'.4 Reporters have long been aware of the nature of these tactics, aware that ‘by now the sheer weight of years of firepower, massive sweeps, and grand forced population shifts have reduced the population base of the ..... .Â'5 so that conceivably, by brute force, we may still hope to ‘winÂ'.

One thing is clear: so long as an organized social life can be maintained in South Vietnam, the NLF will be a powerful, probably dominant, force. This is the dilemma which has always plagued American policy, and which has made it impossible for us to permit even the most rudimentary democratic institutions in South Vietnam. For these reasons we have been forced to the solution outlined by Professor Huntington: to crush the peopleÂ's war, we must eliminate the people.

A second thing is tolerably clear: there has been no modification in this policy. Once again, as two years ago, there is mounting popular protest against the war. Once again, a tactical {33} adjustment is being devised that will permit Washington to pursue its dual goal, to pacify the people of South Vietnam while pacifying the American people also. The first of these tasks has not been accomplished too well. The second, to our shame, has been managed quite successfully, for the most part. Now, we hear that the burden of fighting the war is to be shifted away from the American infantry to the B52s and fighter-bombers and a mercenary force of Vietnamese. Only a token force, of between 200,000 and 300,000 men, backed by the Pacific Naval and Air command, will be retained, indefinitely, to ensure that the Vietnamese have the right of self-determination.

At a recent press conference, Averell Harriman explained that the North Vietnamese cannot believe that we really intend to abandon the huge military bases we have constructed in Vietnam, such as the one at Cam Ranh Bay (Village Voice, 27 November 1969). Knowledgeable American observers have found it equally difficult to believe this. For example, as long ago as 27 August 1965, James Reston wrote in the New York Times:

US bases and supply areas are being constructed on a scale far larger than is necessary to care for the present level of American forces in fact, the US base at Cam Ranh ... is being developed into another Okinawa, not merely for the purposes of this war, but as a major power complex from which American officials hope a wider alliance of Asian nations, with the help of the US, will eventually be able to contain the expansion of China.

The phrase #145;contain the expansion of ChinaÂ' must be understood as code for the unpronounceable expression: ‘repress movements for national independence and social reconstruction in Southeast AsiaÂ'.

Premier Eisaku Sato, in a speech described by American officials as part of a joint Japanese-American policy statement, announced that we are entering a ‘new Pacific ageÂ' in which ‘a new order will be created by Japan and the United StatesÂ' (New York Times, 22 November 1969). His words, one must assume, were chosen advisedly. To perpetuate this new order we will need military bases such as that at Cam Ranh Bay, which can play the role of the Canal Zone in the western hemisphere. There we can base our own forces and train those of our loyal dependencies. {34}

We will no doubt soon proceed to construct an ‘inter-AsianÂ' army that can protect helpless governments from their own populations, much as the Brazilians were called in to legitimize our Dominican intervention. Where popular rebellion is in progress, these forces can gain valuable experience. Thus a senior American officer at Camp Bearcat in South Vietnam, where Thai units are based, explains that ‘they are infusing their army with experience they could never get in their own homeland.... They are coordinating their own piece of real estateÂ'. And a Thai colonel adds: ‘If my country ever has the same subversion, IÂ'll have to fight there. I want to practice hereÂ' (New York Times, 3 December 1969). Surely Reston was right in 1965 in speculating about our long-range plans for the South Vietnamese bases, from which our ‘token forceÂ' of a quarter of a million men will operate in the 1970s.6

Who can complain about a quarter of a million men, a force that can be compared, let us say, with the Japanese army of 160,000 which invaded North China in 1937, in an act of aggression that scandalized the civilized world and set the stage for the Pacific phase of the Second World War? In fact, counterinsurgency experts like Sir Robert Thompson have long argued that the American forces were far too large to be effective, and have advocated a ‘low-cost, long-haul strategyÂ' of a sort which will now very likely be adopted by the Nixon administration, if, once again, the American people will trust their leaders and settle into passivity.

As American combat troops are withdrawn, their place, it is {35} hoped, will be taken by a more effective force of Vietnamese - just as Czechoslovakia is controlled, it is reported, by fewer than 100,000 Russian troops. Meanwhile, the war will no doubt be escalated technologically. It will become more ‘capital intensiveÂ'.7 Some of the prospects were revealed in a speech by Chief of Staff William Westmoreland, reported in the Christian Science Monitor (25-7 October 1969) under the heading: ‘Technologically the Vietnam war has been a great success.Â' General Westmoreland ‘sees machines carrying more and more of the burdenÂ'. He says:

I see an army built into and around an integrated area control system that exploits the advanced technology of communications, sensors, fire direction, and the required automatic data processing - a system that is sensitive to the dynamics of the ever-changing battlefield - a system that materially assists the tactical commander in making sound and timely decisions.
Further details are presented by Leonard Sullivan, Deputy Director of Research and Development for South-east Asian Matters: 8
These developments open up some very exciting horizons as to what we can do five or ten years from now. When one realizes that we can detect anything that perspires, moves, carries metal, makes a noise, or is hotter or colder than its surroundings, one begins to see the potential. This is the beginning of instrumentation of the entire battlefield. Eventually, we will be able to tell when anybody shoots, what he is shooting at, and where he was shooting from. You begin to get a ‘Year 2000Â' vision of an electronic map with little lights that flash for different kinds of activity. This is what we require for this ‘porousÂ' war, where the friendly and the enemy are all mixed together.

Note the time scale that is projected for Vietnam. News reports reveal some of the early stages of these exciting developments. The New York Times, 22 November 1969, reports a plan to use remote-controlled unmanned aircraft as supply transports for {36} combat areas. On 1 October 1969 the New York Times explains that:

The landscape of Vietnam and the border regions are studded with electronic sensors that beep information into the banks of computers. Radar, cameras, infrared detectors and a growing array of more exotic devices contribute to the mass of information. Not long ago reconnaissance planes began carrying television cameras.

The data go into the Combined Intelligence Center near Tansonnhut Air Base: ‘Day and night in its antiseptic interior a family of blinking, whirring computers devours, digests and spews out a Gargantuan diet of information about the enemyÂ', the better to serve the ‘conglomerate of allied civil and military organizations that work together to destroy the VietcongÂ's underground governmentÂ' - freely admitted to have been the most authentic popular social structure in South Vietnam prior to the American effort to demolish the society of Vietnam. One can understand the gloating of Douglas Pike: ‘The tactics that delivered victory in the Viet Minh war, however impressive once, had been relegated by science to the military history textbook.Â'9

What this means is, to put it simply, that we intend to turn the land of Vietnam into an automated murder machine. The techniques of which Westmoreland, Sullivan and Pike are so proud are, of course, designed for use against a special kind of enemy: one who is too weak to retaliate, whose land can be occupied. These ‘Year 2000Â' devices, which Westmoreland describes as a quantum jump in warfare, are fit only for colonial wars. There is surely an element of lunacy in this technocratic nightmare. And if {37} we are still at all capable of honesty, we will, with little difficulty, identify its antecedents.

Our science may yet succeed in bringing to reality the fears of Bernard Fall - no alarmist, and fundamentally in favour of the war during its early years - who wrote in one of his last essays that ‘Vietnam as a cultural and historic entity ... is threatened with extinction ... the countryside literally dies under the blows of the largest military machine ever unleashed on an area of this sizeÂ'. The South Vietnamese Minister of Information wrote in 1968 that ordinary Vietnamese would continue ‘to be horrified and embittered at the way the Americans fight their war.... Our peasants will remember their cratered rice fields and defoliated forests, devastated by an alien air force that seems at war with the very land of VietnamÂ'.10

American reporters have told us the same thing so often that it is almost superfluous to quote. Tom Buckley - to mention only the most recent - describes the delta and the central lowlands:

... bomb craters beyond counting, the dead gray and black fields, forests that have been defoliated and scorched by napalm, land that has been ploughed flat to destroy Vietcong hiding places. And everywhere can be seen the piles of ashes forming the outlines of huts and houses, to show where hamlets once stood.11

The truth about defoliants is only beginning to emerge, with the discovery that one of the two primary agents used is ‘potentially dangerous, but needing further studyÂ' while the other causes cancer and birth defects, and probably mental retardation. Both will continue to be used in Vietnam against enemy ‘training and regroupment centresÂ' - i.e. anywhere we please, throughout the countryside.12 {38}

Of course it may be argued that the American government did not know, in 1961, that these agents were so dangerous. That is true. It was merely an experiment. Virtually nothing was known about what the effects might be. Perhaps there would be no ill effects, or perhaps - at the other extreme - Vietnam would become unfit for human life, or a race of mutants and mental retardates would be created. How could we know, without trying? In such ways ‘the tactics that delivered victory in the Viet Minh war, however impressive once, had been relegated by science to the military history textbookÂ'.

To see what may lie ahead, IÂ'd like to turn away from Vietnam to a less familiar case. It has been claimed that Vietnam is the second most heavily bombarded country in history. The most intensively bombarded, so it seems, is Laos. According to Le Monde, ‘North Vietnam was more heavily bombed than Korea; Laos is now being bombed even more than North Vietnam. And this battering has been going on for over five years. ... The US Air Force carries out more than 12,500 raids a month.Â'13 On the same day, 1 October 1969, the New York Times announced its discovery that in Laos, ‘the rebel economy and social fabricÂ' are now the main target of the American bombardment, which is claimed to be a success:

Refugees from the Plaine des Jarres area say that during recent months most open spaces have been evacuated. Both civilians and soldiers have retreated into the forests or hills and frequently spend most of the daylight hours in caves or tunnels. Refugees said they could only plough their fields at night because they were unsafe {39} during the day. ‘So long as the US bombing continues at its new level,Â' a European diplomat said here this week, ‘so-called Communist territory is little but a shooting range....Â' The bombing, by creating refugees, deprives the Communists of their chief source of food and transport. The population of the Pathet Lao zone has been declining for several years and the Pathet Lao find it increasingly difficult to fight a ‘peopleÂ's warÂ' with fewer and fewer people.

The worldÂ's most advanced society has found the answer to peopleÂ's war: eliminate the people.

It is, incidentally, remarkable that the New York Times can so blandly announce that the rebel economy and social fabric are the main target of the American bombardment. It is remarkable that this claim, which, if correct, sets American policy at the moral level of Nazi Germany, can be merely noted in a casual comment, with - so far as I know - no public reaction of horror and indignation.

Still, it is good that the American press has discovered that the rebel economy and social fabric are the target of the American bombardment of Laos. Perhaps we will be spared the pretence that our targets are steel and concrete, or that the bombing is ‘the most restrained in modern warfareÂ' (as McGeorge Bundy so elegantly put it at the time when virtually every structure in North Vietnam, outside of the centres of Hanoi and Haiphong, was being demolished).

The discovery has been mysteriously delayed. For example, in July 1968, the south-east Asia expert of Le Monde, Jacques Decornoy, published detailed reports of his visits to the liberated areas of Laos: ‘a world without noise, for the surrounding villages have disappeared, the inhabitants themselves living hidden in the mountains ... it is dangerous to lean out at any time of the night or dayÂ' because of the ceaseless bombardment which leads to ‘the scientific destruction of the areas held by the enemyÂ'. ‘The Americans are trying to “break” the Laotian Left, both psychologically and if possible, physically.Â' The nature of their relentless attack ‘can only be explained if the target is the central administration of the Neo Lao HaksatÂ' - the political organization that won handily in 1958 in the only unrigged election in Laos. This electoral victory inspired the {40} American effort at subversion that led to the Laotian crisis in the early sixties, which still persists.

Decornoy describes ‘the motionless ruins and deserted housesÂ' of the central town of Sam-Neua district:

The first real raid against the population centre itself was launched on 19 February 1965. Very serious attacks were made on it quite recently on 17 and 19 March 1968.... The two ends of the town were razed to the ground. The old ruins of 1965 have disappeared, those of March 1968 were still ‘smokingÂ' when we visited them. Branches of trees lay all along the length of the river, houses were totally burned out (phosphorus had been used). At the other end of Sam-Neua, the sight was even more painful. Everywhere enormous craters, the church and many houses were demolished. In order to reach the people who might be living there, the Americans dropped their all-too-famous fragmentation bombs. Here lay a ‘mother bombÂ' disembowelled, by the side of the road. All round, over a dozen metres, the earth was covered with ‘daughter bombsÂ', little machines that the Vietnamese know well, unexploded and hiding hundreds of steel splinters. ... One of the officials of Sam-Neua district told us that between February 1965 and March 1968, 65 villages had been destroyed. A number impossible to verify in a short report, but it is a fact that between Sam-Neua and a place about 30 kilometres away where we stayed, no house in the villages and hamlets had been spared. Bridges had been destroyed, fields up to the rivers were holed with bomb craters.

Decornoy reports that ‘American raids on “liberated Laos” began in May 1964, therefore well before the Gulf of Tonkin incident (August 1964) and the policy of escalation to North Vietnam (spring 1965). For this reason, Laos has, in some ways, served as a testing ground or experimental siteÂ'. He describes the amazing persistence of the Laotians in maintaining and advancing the social revolution in the face of this attack, their ‘virulent nationalismÂ' and refusal to follow foreign models, the schools and factories in caves, the prosperity of the rare villages that have still, for unknown reasons, escaped destruction. Finally he quotes an American diplomat in Vientiane who says: ‘To make progress in this country, it is necessary to level everything. The inhabitants must go back to zero, lose their traditional culture, for it blocks everything.Â' And Decornoy comments: ‘The Americans accuse the North Vietnamese of intervening militarily in the country, but {41} it is they who talk of reducing Laos to zero, while the Pathet Lao exalts the national culture and national independence.Â'

No doubt Laos is still serving as a testing ground or experimental site for the next stage of the Vietnam war, for our new long-haul, low-cost policy. If the American people will only trust their leaders, perhaps there is still a chance to crush the peopleÂ's war in South Vietnam by methods that will be as well concealed as have been those of the Laotian war.

The secret can be kept. Americans know virtually nothing about the bombing of South Vietnam. To my knowledge, there has been only one pro-Western correspondent who has spent time in the liberated zones of South Vietnam, Katsuichi Honda - and I am sure that his reports in Asahi in the fall of 1967 are known to very few Americans.14 He describes, for example, the incessant attacks on undefended villages by gunboats in the Mekong river and by helicopter gunships ‘firing away at random at farmhouses

They seemed to fire whimsically and in passing even though they were not being shot at from the ground nor could they identify the people as NLF. They did it impulsively for fun, using the farmers for targets as if in a hunting mood. They are hunting Asians.... This whimsical firing would explain the reason why the surgical wards in every hospital in the towns of the Mekong Delta were full of wounded.

He is speaking, notice, of the Mekong Delta, where few North Vietnamese soldiers were identified until several months after the Tet offensive, where, according to American intelligence, there were 800 North Vietnamese troops before last summer;15 and {42} which contained some forty per cent of the population of South Vietnam prior to the American assault.

Occasionally such material finds its way to the American press. Consider again the Mekong Delta. ‘In March [1969] alone, the United States 9th Infantry Division reported that it killed 3,504 Viet Cong troops and sympathizers in the northern delta [and] senior officers confidently forecast that they will continue to kill at least 100 a day well into the summer.Â' The ‘conflagration ... is tearing the social fabric apartÂ'. In ‘free-fire zones, the Americans could bring to bear at any time the enormous firepower available from helicopter gunships, bombers and artillery ... fighter bombers and artillery pound the enemy positions into the grey porridge that the green delta land becomes when pulverized by high explosivesÂ'.16

Apparently the performance of the 9th Division was not entirely satisfactory, however: ‘... . in the Mekong Delta, US military advisers at My Tho told a UPI correspondent, Robert Kaylor, that the governmentÂ's pacification programme was still being hampered by the effects of indiscriminate killing of civilians by US 9th Infantry Division troops recently withdrawn from the area. “You canÂ't exactly expect people who have had parts of their family blown away by the 9th to be wholeheartedly on our side,” said the US source, a member of a pacification team.Â'17

In the Monitor, 14 October 1969, there is a front page story reviewing such efforts. It explains that ‘the proportion of the country “pacified” has risen with the flow of peasants to resettlement and refugee areasÂ', although the Viet Cong ‘currently are intensifying their campaign to drive peasants back to their home areas where [they] have a better chance of controlling themÂ'. The picture is clear. We, in our magnanimity, are using our modernizing instruments, bombs and artillery, to lead the suffering peasants to the promised land of resettlement and refugee {43} areas. while the ferocious Viet Cong - mere ‘village thugsÂ', as the MIT political scientist, Ithiel Pool, explains in the journal of the Gandhi Peace Foundation - cruelly drive them back to their homes. The Monitor article also notes that ‘despite years of thought and effort, officials here are still not agreed on how best to pacify a troubled land. In those years, pacification has advanced from being a theoretical ideal - though inconvenient - to the more important but second-class status of being “the other war”Â' - and a proper theoretical exercise for American scientists and scholars.

The New York Times, 24 September 1969, presents an example of how pacification proceeds. North-west of Saigon, 700 soldiers encircled a village, killing twenty-two and arresting fifty-three. It was the fourth such operation in this village in fifteen months. As for the villagers: ‘The Viet Cong are everywhere, they say, and will be back when the Americans leave.Â' An American junior officer, looking at the deserted central market, had this to say:

They say this village is 80 per cent VC supporters. By the time we finish this it will be 95 per cent.Â' Such reports are hardly more newsworthy than a small item of 27 September which notes ‘that United States Army helicopter gunships mistakenly attacked a group of Vietnamese civilians 25 miles west of Tamky Tuesday, killing 14 civilians. ... United States helicopter gunships killed 7 unarmed civilians and wounded 17 others in a similar incident 16 September in the Mekong delta.Â' It is not easy to avoid such accidents as we try to ensure that the Viet Cong constituency ceases to exist.

In Look magazine, 18 November 1969, Foreign Editor Robert Moskin describes his visit to a refugee camp, which ‘tells part of the story of VietnamÂ's hopelessnessÂ'. Its 3,125 refugees (240 men) were transferred to this ‘desolate sand-dune campÂ' in a military sweep last summer from an island that was regarded as a VC stronghold: ‘The rest of the men are still hiding with the VC in the tall grass.Â' This is in Quang Nam province, where even the American officials in charge admit that the battle was lost ‘to Viet Cong forces recruited for the most part from within the provinceÂ'.18 With an honesty that others would do well to emulate, {44} Moskin states that in Vietnam ‘AmericaÂ's historic westward-driving wave has crestedÂ'.

With justice, ‘a staff major [of the American 1st Division in Chulai] said: “We are at war with the 10-year-old children. It may not be humanitarian, but thatÂ's what itÂ's like.” Â'19

And now there is Song My ‘PinkvilleÂ'. More than two decades of indoctrination and counter-revolutionary interventions have created the possibility of a name like ‘PinkvilleÂ' - and the acts that may be done in a place so named. Orville and Jonathan Schell have pointed out20 what any literate person should realize, that this was no isolated atrocity, but the logical consequence of a virtual war of extermination directed against helpless peasants: ‘enemiesÂ', ‘redsÂ', ‘dinksÂ'. But there are, perhaps, still deeper roots. Some time ago, I read with a slight shock the statement by Eqbal Ahmad that ‘America has institutionalized even its genocideÂ', referring to the fact that the extermination of the Indians ‘has become the object of public entertainment and childrenÂ's gamesÂ'.21 Shortly after, I was thumbing through my daughterÂ's fourth-grade social science reader.22 The protagonist, Robert, is told the story of the extermination of the Pequot tribe by Captain John Mason:

His little army attacked in the morning before it was light and took the Pequots by surprise. The soldiers broke down the stockade with their axes, rushed inside, and set fire to the wigwams. They killed nearly all the braves, squaws, and children, and burned their corn and other food. There were no Pequots left to make more trouble. When the other Indian tribes saw what good fighters the white men were, they kept the peace for many years. I wish I were a man and had been there,Â' thought Robert.

Nowhere does Robert express, or hear, second thoughts about the matter. The text omits some other pertinent remarks: for example, by Cotton Mather, who said that ‘it was supposed that no less than six hundred Pequot souls were brought down to hell {45} that day.Â'23 Is it an exaggeration to suggest that our history of extermination and racism is reaching its climax in Vietnam today? It is not a question that Americans can easily put aside.

The revelation of the Song My atrocity to a wide public appears to have been a by-product of the November mobilization. As Richard L. Strout wrote in the Monitor:

American press self-censorship thwarted Mr RidenhourÂ's disclosures for a year. ‘No one wanted to go into it,Â' his agent said of telegrams sent to Life, Look, and Newsweek magazines outlining allegations.
Except for the recent antiwar march in Washington the event might not have been publicized. In connexion with the march a news offshoot (Dispatch News Service) of the left-wing Institute of Policy Studies of this city aggressively told and marketed the story to approximately 30 US and Canadian newspapers.24

Apart from this, it probably would have disappeared from history, along with who knows what else.

The first investigation by the Pentagon ‘reported that the carnage was due to artillery fire. Civilian casualties by artillery fire among hostile villages are so common that this explanation ended the inquiryÂ'.25 But the murdered Vietnamese were not the victims of artillery fire. Since the soldiers looked into the faces of their victims, the inquiry must continue, despite the difficulties. Henry Kamm reported in the New York Times that:

The task of the investigators is complicated by the fact that last January, most of the inhabitants of the peninsula were forcibly evacuated by American and South Vietnamese troops in the course of a drive to clear the area of Viet Cong. More than 12,000 persons were removed from Batangan Peninsula by helicopters and taken to a processing camp near this provincial capital. Heavy American bombing and artillery and naval shelling had destroyed many of the houses and forced them to live in caves and bunkers for many months before the evacuation. ... An elaborate interrogation and screening procedure, in which American intelligence agents were said to have taken an {46} important part, yielded only a hundred or so active Viet Cong suspects. Most of the people were sent to a newly established refugee camp. ... Despite the extensive movement of the population and the military operation, the Viet Cong remain active in the area.26

On 22 November, Kamm adds the further information that ‘the number of refugees “generated” - the term for the people forcibly dislocated in this process - exceeded intelligence estimates fourfoldÂ'. ‘The 12,000, instead of being scattered in many hamlets where it would be difficult to keep out the Viet Cong, are now concentrated in six guarded, camp-like settlements.Â'

It is perhaps remarkable that none of this appears to occasion much concern. It is only the acts of a company of half-crazed GIs that are regarded as a scandal, a disgrace to America. It will, indeed, be a still greater national scandal - if we assume that to be possible - if they alone are subjected to criminal prosecution, but not those who have created and accepted the long-term atrocity to which they contributed one detail - merely a few hundred more murdered Vietnamese.

Recently, a study of American public opinion about Vietnam concluded with this speculation: ‘... . little reaction to the war is based on humanitarian or moral considerations. Americans are not now rejecting “war”, they merely wish to see this current conflict ended. To achieve this goal, most Americans would pursue a more militant policy and ignore resultant atrocities.Â'27 We may soon discover whether this speculation is correct. Of {47} course, there is sure to be a segment of American society that will not ‘ignore resultant atrocitiesÂ' - namely, the irresponsible, loudmouth vocal minority, or those who are described so nicely by Colonel Joseph Bellas, commanding officer of a hospital in Vietnam where soldiers boycotted Thanksgiving dinner in protest against the war: ‘TheyÂ're young, theyÂ're idealistic and donÂ't like manÂ's inhumanity to man. As they get older they will become wiser and more tolerant.Â'28 If a majority of the American people will, indeed, ignore resultant atrocities and support NixonÂ's policy of pursuing a war without discernible end, then this segment of American society may be subjected to domestic repression of a sort that is not without precedent in American history; we seem to be seeing the early signs today with the savage repression of the Panthers, the conspiracy trial in Chicago, and other incidents.

The fact that repression may be attempted does not imply that it must succeed. Surely the possibility exists, today, to create a broad-based movement of opposition to war and repression that might stave off such an attack. It is now even imaginable, as a few years ago it was not, that a significant American left may emerge that will be a voice in national affairs, and even, perhaps, a potential force for radical social change. There has been a remarkable shift in popular attitudes over the past months, an openness to radical political thinking of a sort that I do not recall for many years. To let these opportunities pass is to condemn many others to the fate of Vietnam.

Is there an ‘honourableÂ' way out of Vietnam - meaning by that a way that might be tolerable to the present state of American opinion? The question is important, for if the answer is negative, it may well be that the threat of extinction that Fall recognized will in fact be realized. It is important to stress this possibility, in view of the present mood in certain ‘movementÂ' circles where it is a criterion of oneÂ's radicalism to believe that America has been defeated and that the Vietnamese will win. On the contrary, a serious person will follow GramsciÂ's maxim: pessimism of the intelligence, optimism of the will. There is not much doubt that the United States has the power to deny victory, or even continued existence, to the people of Vietnam. No one knows whether the {48} present strategy of capital-intensive war can reduce the level of organized social life in Vietnam to the point where an American-imposed solution may, in its terms, be successful.

There surely is an ‘honourableÂ' way of ending the war. The PRG and DRV delegations in Paris have proposed such a way, repeatedly. It is a measure of the GovernmentÂ's contempt for the American people that Nixon was willing to publish Ho Chi MinhÂ's conciliatory letter, with the statement that it signified - in NixonÂ's phrase - ‘the other sideÂ's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join in seeking peaceÂ'. It seems that the intermediary in the Ho-Nixon exchange was Jean Sainteny. He was interviewed by Joseph Kraft, who writes:

I saw Sainteny at the end of September, just after his return from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi. He had had a long talk with Premier Pham Van Dong. He was persuaded that the other side was prepared to accept a settlement that would include an independent and non-Communist South Vietnam set in a neutralist Southeast Asia. The obstacle to agreement in his view was that Hanoi did not have any faith in Mr NixonÂ's claim that he wanted an agreement. On the contrary, the North Vietnamese thought the United States was still trying to impose on Saigon, by military means, a pro-American government hostile to Hanoi. M. Sainteny felt - and his feelings were made known to the President - that the United States could dispel HanoiÂ's doubts in two ways. One would be a formal statement that the United States recognized the principle of total withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam at some unstipulated date. The other would be by broadening the present regime in Saigon to include some political figures who were not die-hard anti-Communists.29

Corroboratory evidence appears in an article by Philippe Devillers in LÂ'Actualité, 24 October 1969, and Averell Harriman has publicly stated that KraftÂ's report is consistent with his understanding of the situation.30 Subsequent statements by Xuan Thuy and Mme Binh in Paris provide further confirmation of the possibilities for a reasonable settlement.

Since 1960, the NLF has demanded that a neutralized South Vietnam be governed by a coalition in which they would have a {49} fair representation. It is this demand that we have consistently opposed - not surprisingly, in view of the judgement of the American mission at the time, and since, on the political power of the NLF relative to that of the succession of puppets we have installed. When the full-scale American invasion began, Bernard Fall cited a remark to George Chaffard of Le Monde by a ‘high-ranking spokesman of the FrontÂ': ‘We have not fought all these years simply to end up by installing one set of dictators in place of the old.Â' Fall added: ‘One does not fight for eight long years, under the crushing weight of American armour, napalm, jet bombers and, finally, vomiting gases, for the sheer joy of handing over what one fights for to some bureaucrat in Hanoi, merely on the say-so of a faraway party apparatus.Â'31 Despite the intensive American effort since 1965 to destroy social life in Vietnam, there is no reason to believe that the situation is fundamentally different today.

NixonÂ's speech of 3 November 1969 must be understood as a rejection of these possibilities for an ‘honourableÂ' settlement, one that should be acceptable to a large, I should think overwhelming, segment of the American public. Nixon denied the existence of the PRG-DRV initiatives, and made it clear that we have no intention of withdrawing our expeditionary force or broadening the Saigon regime. The present Saigon regime, which exists solely by the force of American arms, is not an acceptable partner in a coalition with the PRG and would no doubt collapse were a realistic effort to resolve the conflict seriously contemplated.

Under these conditions, it is important to take note of recent political developments in Saigon. President Thieu has apparently abandoned any effort to construct a significant political base. Elizabeth Pond reports from Saigon that his new party ‘should be very similar to the Can Lao Party [virtually, a branch of DiemÂ's secret police], as it is being directed by old Diemists, several of whom were Can Lao membersÂ'. Thieu has been able to find no political base apart from the generals and the northern {50} Catholics - essentially a reconstruction of the Diem regime.32 One of the Hoa Hao factions recently left ThieuÂ's party in protest ‘against the intensification of military control of the government in recent months - and the PresidentÂ's continuing refusal to deal seriously even with the member groups of his own allianceÂ'. Its leader asserted that the PresidentÂ's coalition ‘cannot do anything good for the countryÂ'.33 A report on the non-Communist opposition in South Vietnam quotes Pham Ba Cam, a Hoa Hao leader: ‘ItÂ's not very healthy to be in the opposition in Vietnam. If you want to learn about the status of the non-Communist opposition, go to Con Son [offshore prison island]. ThatÂ's where youÂ'll find the largest gathering.Â'34 As Pond reports, ‘President ThieuÂ's decision to organize an Army/Catholic party - at this time and in this manner - sets the course for increasing isolation of the Saigon regimeÂ'. It is a decision ‘to maintain the narrow interests and power of the existing military oligarchy as long as possibleÂ'.

This narrowing of the base of the Saigon regime reflects the political realities of South Vietnam. It also reflects a rational political judgement on the part of General Thieu:

As Vietnamese sources analyse President ThieuÂ's thinking, he is calculating that the US cannot afford to lose the war and is therefore stuck here almost no matter what Saigon does. The US might dare, it is reasoned, to abandon the Thieu regime within a year or so, but it would never dare to destroy the South Vietnamese Army. If President Thieu links his destiny inextricably to that of the Army, then, he may figure that the US cannot depose him.35

Thus the current political developments confirm, once again, {51} the failure of the American military to create a workable Quisling regime in the manner of the Russians in Czechoslovakia or the Germans in much of occupied Europe. The consequences of this situation are summarized adequately by Jacques Decornoy:

‘Under these conditions, a military solution may be a task for several decades, supposing, that is, that there still remain Vietnamese to fight and Americans to accept a conflict without end and without hope.Â'36

Twenty years ago the PeopleÂ's Republic of China was founded. Just a few months earlier, Dean Acheson had formed a committee to reassess American policy in Asia, now that China was ‘lostÂ'. The committee was to operate under this instruction: ‘You will please take it as your assumption that it is a fundamental decision of American policy that the United States does not intend to permit further extension of Communist domination on the continent of Asia or in the south-east Asia area... Â'37 Acheson made his thoughts more precise, shortly afterwards, when writing on the Soviet threat: ‘It is not only the threat of direct military attack which must be considered, but also that of conquest by default, by pressure, by persuasion, by subversion, by “neutralism”Â'38

In May 1950, Acheson announced that economic aid and military equipment would be sent to the French in Indochina ‘in order to assist them in restoring stabilityÂ'. Not long after, the State Department explained our support for French imperialism in Indochina in these terms: ‘. . . the fall of Indochina ... would be taken by many as a sign that the force of communism is irresistible and would lead to an attitude of defeatism.... Communist forces there must be decisively conquered down to the last pocket of resistanceÂ' - in the name of French imperialism39. The ‘much-needed rice, rubber, and tinÂ' were also cited as a justification for our support for the French in their ill-fated effort to reconquer their former colony. Upon their failure, we took over management of the enterprise directly. {52}

In 1955 the Communist threat was defined, very perceptively, in an extensive study of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association, The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy, a study that involved a representative segment of the tiny élite that largely determines foreign policy, whoever is technically in office. The primary threat of Communism is the economic transformation of the Communist powers ‘in ways which reduce their willingness and ability to complement the industrial economies of the WestÂ'. Communism, in short, reduces the ‘willingness and abilityÂ' of underdeveloped countries to function in the world capitalist economy in the manner of the Philippines - to take a classic Asian example - where:

Their economy has for nearly half a century been deliberately geared into that of the United States to an extent which caused Mr McNutt, in testifying as High Commissioner, to say that ‘our businessmen and our statesmen in past years allowed the Philippines to become a complete economic dependency of the United States to a greater degree than any single State of the Union is economically dependent on the rest of the United States.Â'40

Since then, there has been little substantive change in what UN Ambassador Salvador Lopez called the classic colonial economy of the Philippines. To be sure, we have bequeathed them the blessings of democracy. As Tillman Durdin accurately describes this legacy of half a century of colonial domination: ‘Filipinos view elections as a confirmation of the power of the wealthy business and landed interests who back both parties but usually pick the winners before Election Day and quietly give them the most support. In this case they picked President Marcos.Â'41 And in gratitude, the Filipinos have helped us in our war in Vietnam, in the manner explained in a recent report of the Symington subcommittee. William Selover summarized this report in a recent Monitor:

The hearings showed, for example, that the US taxpayer has been {53} paying for the Philippine troop commitment in Vietnam. It has also shown that, without this payment, the Philippines would not have sent a single man to help the US in Vietnam. ... Administration officials admitted paying the Philippines some $40 million to send the troops to Vietnam.42

Still more revealing is the stated purpose of the US military commitment to the Philippines. Selover reports Lieutenant-General Robert H. WarrenÂ's admission that the commitment was designed partly ‘to maintain internal security and stability and, thereby, make our own activities over there more secureÂ'. Senator Symington put it succinctly, with General WarrenÂ's reluctant assent: ‘In other words we are paying the Philippine Government to protect us from the Philippine people who do not agree with the policies of the government or do not like Americans.Â' Pentagon officials admitted in the hearings that ‘the only real threat that the Philippines faces . .. [is] . . . internal subversionÂ'. The threat is related, perhaps, to the fact that, for most of the population, living standards have not materially changed since the Spanish occupation.

It is this ‘Communist threatÂ' that we have been combating in Vietnam, where, as has frequently been noted, Vietnamese communism threatens the new order that we have been trying to construct in Asia with Japan as junior partner, linked to Asia by essentially colonial relationships. As President Eisenhower expressed it:

One of JapanÂ's greatest opportunities for increased trade lies in a free and developing Southeast Asia. . . . The great need in one country is for raw materials, in the other country for manufactured goods. The two regions complement each other markedly. By strengthening of Vietnam and helping ensure the safety of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, we gradually develop the great trade potential between this region ... and highly industrialized Japan to the benefit of {54} both. In this way freedom in the Western Pacific will be greatly strengthened.43
It remains to be seen how long Japan will be able to fend off economic intervention of a sort that is increasingly turning Western Europe into a dependency of American-based multi-national corporations, those ‘US enterprises abroad [which] in the aggregate comprise the third largest country ... in the world - with a gross product greater than that of any country except the United States and the Soviet Union’. 44

It is not likely that the population of the empire - the ‘integrated world economyÂ' dominated by American capital, to use the technical euphemism - will remain quiescent, willing indefinitely to complement the industrial economies of the West. Seventy-five years ago, shortly before the American invasion of the Philippines in a war that was, apart from scale, rather like our present war in Vietnam, the Philippine nationalist José Rizal castigated his countrymen because they were ‘like a slave who asked only for a bandage to wrap the chain so that it may rattle less and not ulcerate the skinÂ'. Those days are past. Those whom Marx called ‘the slaves and drudges of the [bourgeois] orderÂ' are no longer satisfied with a bandage to wrap their chains, and their discontent will lead to turmoil and violent repression, so long as we consent.

What can we do to affect the events that are to come? First, we must not make the mistake of placing trust in the government. The large upsurge of anti-war sentiment can be an effective device {55} for changing national policy if it is sustained in continuing mass actions across the country. Otherwise the administration can ride out the storm and continue as before to systematically demolish the society of South Vietnam and Laos. It is difficult week after week, month after month to sustain a high level of protest against the war. As American society becomes more polarized and the true, familiar Nixon emerges in the person of Mitchell or Agnew, as the threat of repression becomes more real, it will be hard to maintain the kinds of resistance and protest that the Vietnam catastrophe demands. As the reports of massacres and automated murder become routine, the impulse to respond by violence may become more difficult to stifle, despite the realization that this can only have the effect of bringing the mass of the population to ‘ignore resultant atrocitiesÂ'. Continued mass actions, patient explanation, principled resistance can be boring, depressing. But those who programme the B52 attacks and the ‘pacificationÂ' exercise are not bored, and as long as they continue in their work, so must we.

This essay appeared in the 1 January 1970 issue of the New York Review of Books. Reprinted by kind permission. {56}

Notes

  1. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke as quoted by Townsend Hoopes, see New York Times, 28 September 1969.Back
  2. No More Vietnams?, R. Pfeffer (ed.) (Harper & Row, 1968).Back
  3. For detailed analysis based largely on Defense Department sources, see Gabriel Kolko, London Bulletin, August 1969.Back
  4. No More Vietnams? For further discussion, see my article in the New York Review, 2 January 1969 and my At War with Asia (Pantheon, 1970), Chapter 1, Section 3.Back
  5. Elizabeth Pond, Christian Science Monitor, 8 November 1969.Back
  6. On 10 December 1969, after this article was written, Reston returned to the question of Cam Ranh Bay, stating that it was now ‘an air and naval base which is the best in AsiaÂ', and that it has been a ‘fundamental question throughout the Paris negotiationsÂ' whether the US is willing to abandon it ‘and many other modern military basesÂ'. He raises the question whether the US would withdraw all troops or only all ‘combat forcesÂ', a plan which ‘could leave a couple of hundred thousand Americans in Vietnam to maintain and fly the planes and helicopter gunships and continue to train and supply and help direct the VietnameseÂ'.
  7. There is no indication of any serious intention to withdraw all forces or to abandon the bases. As Joseph Kraft has reported (see p. 49) the American refusal to commit itself to the principle of complete withdrawal is one of the factors blocking progress in Paris. Back
  8. In the apt phrase of E. Herman and R. Duboff, ‘How to coo like a dove while fighting to winÂ', pamphlet of Philadelphia SANE, 20 S. Street, Philadelphia, Penna. 19107.Back
  9. Congressional Record, 8 August 1969. Cited in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, October 1969 (1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, Mass. - an important journal for those concerned with Asian affairs).Back
  10. War, Peace, and the Viet Cong (MIT, 1969). He estimates that in 1963 ‘perhaps half the population of South Vietnam at least tacitly supported the NLFÂ'. The same estimate was given by the US Mission in 1962. Elsewhere, he has explained that in late 1964 it was impossible to consider an apparently genuine offer of a coalition government, because there was no force that could compete politically with the Viet Cong, with the possible exception of the Buddhists, who were not long after suppressed as a political force by Marshal KyÂ's American-backed storm troopers. The same difficulty has been noted, repeatedly, by spokesmen for the American and Saigon governments and reporters. For some examples, see Herman and Duboff, op. cit., or my American Power and the New Mandarins (Chatto & Windus, 1969), Chapter 3.Back
  11. New York Times, 11 June 1968.Back
  12. New York Times Magazine, 23 November 1969.Back
  13. See Washington Post, 31 October 1969; Los Angeles Times, 31 October 1969; New York Post, 4 November 1969; Science, 7 November 1969. A Vietnamese student in the United States, Ngo Vinh Long, has summarized much of what is known, including his personal experience from 1959 to 1963 when he visited ‘virtually every hamlet and village in the countryÂ' as a military map maker, in Thoi-Bao Ga, November 1969, 76a Pleasant Street, Cambridge, Mass., a monthly publication of Vietnamese students in the United States. He describes how defoliation has been used since 1961 to drive peasants into government-controlled camps, and from his own experience and published records in Vietnam, he records some of the effects: starvation, death, hideously deformed babies. He quotes the head of the Agronomy Section of the Japan Science Council who claims that by 1967 about half the arable land had been seriously affected. For American estimates, see the report of the Daddario subcommittee of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 8 August 1969. They estimate the total area sprayed through 1968 as 6,600 square miles (extrapolating through 1969 the figure would reach about 8,600 square miles, about sixty per cent of this respraying - over ten per cent of it crop destruction).Back
  14. Weekly selection, 1 October 1969.Back
  15. They have appeared in English, and can be obtained from the Committee for the English publication of ‘Vietnam - a voice from the villagesÂ', do Mrs Reiko Ishida, 2-13-7, Nishikata, Bunyo-ku, Tokyo.Back
  16. ‘Before this summer, the enemy in the delta consisted mostly of indigenous Vietcong units and guerrillas, many of whom worked during the day in the rice fields and fought at night. The only North Vietnamese were troops and officers who led some of the guerrilla units. They numbered about 800 as against an estimated total of 49,000 Vietcong soldiers and support troops.Â' New York Times, 15 September 1969. On 16 September, The Times reports that ‘for the first time in the war, a regular North Vietnamese army unit, the 18B Regiment, had attacked in the deltaÂ'.Back
  17. New York Times, Peter Arnett, 15 April 1969. Arnett claims that only ninety per cent of the enemy forces of 40,000 are recruited locally, giving a far higher estimate of North Vietnamese than the intelligence reports cited above, or others: e.g., Christian Science Monitor, 16 September 1969, which reports that in the early fall of 1969 ‘North Vietnamese troops in the delta doubled in number, to between 2,000 and 3,000 men.Â'Back
  18. Boston Globe, 1 December 1969.Back
  19. William Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam (Praeger, 1967).Back
  20. Henry Kamm, New York Times, 1 December 1969.Back
  21. New York Times, 26 November 1969.Back
  22. In No More Vietnams? On the widely noted analogy between Vietnam and the Indian wars see my American Power and the New Mandarins, Chapter 3, note 42.Back
  23. Harold B. Clifford, Exploring New England (Follett, 1961).Back
  24. See Howard Zinn, ‘Violence and social changeÂ', Boston University Graduate Journal, Fall 1968. When disease decimated the Indians, Mather said: ‘The woods were almost cleared of those pernicious creatures, to make room for a better growth.Â'Back
  25. On 24 November 1969. Attention Mr Agnew.Back
  26. ibid., 29 November 1969.Back
  27. Henry Kamm, New York Times, 15 November 1969.Back
  28. J. Robinson and S. G. Jacobson, in Vietnam: Issues and Alternatives (Shenkman, 1968), a symposium of the Peace Research Society (International). This organization, following a script by Orwell, is concerned with a special kind of peace research: the question of ‘how pacification can be achieved in turbulent village societiesÂ', along lines that we have been pioneering in Vietnam, for example. The editor explains that the United States is one ‘participant in the game of world dominationÂ'. It might be asked why scholars should assist the Government in this game. The answer is that the foreign policy of the US has been characterized ‘by good-intentioned leaders and policy makersÂ', so the problem, presumably, does not arise. But even the Peace Research Society (International) is not monolithic. It would be unfair to assume that the conclusion of the cited study is mere wishful thinking. It has to be taken seriously.Back
  29. Reuters, Boston Globe, 27 November 1969.Back
  30. Boston Globe, 10 November 1969.Back
  31. In a panel at Johns Hopkins University, 14 November 1969Back
  32. New Society, 22 April 1965, reprinted in Fall and Raskin, Vietnam Reader. Those who speak so glibly of ‘bloodbathsÂ' might note his report that from 1957 through April 1965, ‘over 160,000 South Vietnamese [overwhelmingly Viet Cong] have thus far been killed in this warÂ'. Note the date.Back
  33. Monitor, 6, 8, 14 November 1969. Miss Pond has been one of the few correspondents, over the years, to give any serious attention to Vietnamese political and social life. In the past, her analyses have proven quite accurate. For additional corroboratory information, see D. Gareth Porter, ‘The Diemist restorationÂ', Commonweal, 11 July 1969.Back
  34. John Woodruff, Baltimore Sun, 25 October 1969.Back
  35. Terence Smith, New York Times, dateline 24 October 1969. The scale and character of forceful repression of dissent in South Vietnam have been amply reported. See, for example, Herman and Duboff, op. cit., and references therein.Back
  36. Pond, 6 November 1969.Back
  37. Le Monde diplomatique, November.Back
  38. Memorandum from Acheson to Philip Jessup, cited by Gabriel Kolko, Roots of American Foreign Policy (Beacon Press, 1969), p. 95 (see note 10, p. 82 below).Back
  39. Cited by Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1966 (Wiley, 1968), p.102.Back
  40. ibid., p.116.Back
  41. Rupert Emerson, in J.C. Vincent (ed.), AmericaÂ's Future in the Pacific, 1947.Back
  42. Commenting on the recent elections, New York Times, 16 November 1969. For some discussion of Philippine politics, see Onofre Corpuz, The Philippines (Prentice-Hall, 1966).Back
  43. 28 November 1969: ‘From the hearings it is learned that the US paid South Korea and Thailand as well to send their troops to Vietnam in a show of solidarity.Â' This was somewhat more expensive. According to The Times, 1 December, the bribe to Thailand amounted to a billion dollars.Back
  44. 4 April 1959, quoted in Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (Monthly Review Press, 1969). On early American post-war policy in this area, see John Dower, ‘Occupied Japan and the American LakeÂ', in AmericaÂ's Asia, M. Seldon and E. Friedman (eds.), (Pantheon, 1970). He presents material in support of the analysis of ‘critical Japanese commentatorsÂ' that ‘Japan was to be developed not only as a military base against China and the Soviet Union, but also as an industrial base supporting the counter-revolutionary cause in Southeast Asia Â', a policy that was opposed not only by Russia but also by virtually all the members of the Far Eastern Commission. See also his essay on the US-Japan military relationship in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, October 1969 (see note 8 above). For still earlier background, see Gabriel Kolko, Politics of War (Random House, 1968).Back
  45. Leo Model, Foreign Affair, July 1967, quoted in Magdoff, op. cit.Back
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False alarms over BNP distract us from main threat

As mainstream politicians justify acts of mass murder in the name of bogus democracy and US control of the world's oil supplies, Joan McAlpine ("Be wary when fascists try to hide behind racist poison" Herald 29/04/04) asks us to focus our attention on a relatively small group of isolationist anti-immigration rightwingers.

We already have clear laws forbidding harassment, assault or incitement to racial hatred. The true liberal tradition has always distinguished gratuitous offence and intimidation from reasoned arguments and radical thinking.

Why should we need to go one step further to curtail intellectual freedom? By raising false alarms about the alleged BNP threat, when the real danger to millions of dark and light-hued people around the world comes from the rightwing cabal behind George W Bush's presidency and the growing concentration of wealth and power in a handful of transnational corporations, Joan McAlpine would like us to set a precedent we may live to regret.

Indeed she correctly observes our government has already gagged an Islamic fundamentalist cleric, which begs the question: Where do we draw the line? Who defines unacceptable Neo-Nazism or Islamic fundamentalism? Who decides which orthodox historical accounts may be challenged? Who decides which arguments constitute hate speech? A commission set up by the state or the corporate media? If they could ban the BNP, would they seriously stop there? Would 9/11 sceptics be incarcerated? These are very serious questions as the new rulers of Baghdad close down newspapers and radio stations and even rebuke the Qatar government over the graphic nature of Aljazeera's coverage of the Iraqi war of resistance.

As Noam Chomsky said "It is a poor service to the memory of the victims of the holocaust to adopt a central doctrine of their murderers". Nearly six decades after the end of WW2, it comes as no surprise that today's authoritarians pose as anti-fascists. The German National Socialist Party did not rise rapidly in the early 1930s because they were afforded free speech, but because big business, including many foreign multinationals, bankrolled them. Today the same ruling elite supports Bush, Blair and Sharon.

Published in the Herald 29/04/2004
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Outline of the General Introductory Report

After a brief introduction recalling the origins, the composition, the competence and the procedures of the Tribunal, the report contains two parts:

  1. The rules of law which apply.
  2. The crimes charged.

Part 1: The rules of law which apply

Crimes against the peace and wars of aggression

  1. Definition: Crimes against the peace are thus defined by article 6 of the Nuremberg statutes: "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
    treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing".
  2. The illegality of recourse to war in international relations has been stated in numerous texts, of which the most important is the Paris Pact of 27 August 1928 (the Briand-Kellogg Pact), bearing the signature of the President of the United States of America. This is the text which was invoked at the greatest length by the Nuremberg judgements condemning the wars of aggression charged to Germany.
  3. Other international texts condemning recourse to war and bearing the signature of the United States of America will also be cited.
  4. Recourse to war is also unlawful according to the terms of article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the United Nations Charter.
  5. But recourse to war is not only an unlawful act; it is also a criminal act. The discussion which arose at Nuremberg on this {68} point no longer presents any more than a theoretical character, the Nuremberg verdict and the United Nations resolution of 11 December 1946 having hallowed, in positive international law, the criminal character of recourse to war.
  6. Independently of the violation of the fundamental international rule condemning recourse to war in international relations, a war can furthermore constitute a more precise violation of the specific obligations resulting from such and such a treaty. it is in this sense that the Nuremberg judgement enumerated twenty-six agreements violated by Germany.
  7. It should be emphasized that since Nuremberg the notion of war of aggression has undergone a certain evolution. The United Nations Charter mentions in two different paragraphs the necessity to have recourse to peaceful means in order to resolve international disputes on the one hand, and the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State on the other. For its part, the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1960 proclaimed the necessity to permit all peoples "to peacefully and freely exercise their rights to complete independence and integrity of their national territory". Therefore it seems that a difference must henceforth be made between a war waged in order to resolve an international dispute, and a war waged in order to attack the national existence of a state. In the latter case, one is certainly confronted with an international crime of greater seriousness, and one can even wonder if it is not a question of a crime of aggression ofa particular nature, distinct from the crimes of aggression previously described.

War crimes

  1. War crimes are thus defined by the Nuremberg statutes: violations of the laws and customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave
    labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing
    hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military
    necessity.Â’
  2. The fundamental text concerning the rights and practices of {69} war is constituted by the fourth Convention of The Hague of 18
    October 1907, and the ruling which is annexed to it. Article 25 of said ruling hallowed the fundamental principle of positive international law according to
    which ‘belligerents do not have an unlimited right concerning the choice of means of doing harm to the enemy’. Other articles decree the principal
    prohibitions.
  3. Concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, of the wounded and the sick, and the protection of civilians in time of war, the
    basic texts in force are the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which went into effect on 21 October 1950.
  4. As for gases and analogous substances, the basic text is the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This protocol was not ratified by the United States, but it is commonly admitted that its provisions express a
    customary law of universal applicability.
  5. The entirety of the rules, recognized by the United States of America as binding, is contained in an
    official manual ("Department of the Army field manual") entitled The Law of Land Warfare, published by the United States Department of Defense
    in 1956 (reference number: FM 27-10). There is a companion volume of the treaties and Conventions which the American army is required to respect. We shall
    frequently have occasion, in the course of the Tribunal's discussions, to refer to these two documents, which can in no way be contested by the United
    States government.

Crimes against humanity

  1. They are thus defined by the Nuremberg statutes: "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connexion with any crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated".
  2. Discussion of crimes against humanity committed outside of a state of war and those which could be committed in the course of war - discussion which was taken up before the Nuremberg Tribunal - is of no interest to the debates which will take place before our Tribunal. {70}
  3. Crimes against humanity are characterized especially by the extent of the affected populations, and by the motives for these crimes.
  4. In certain cases, the same facts can simultaneously constitute a crime against humanity and a war crime.

Genocide

  1. Genocide, as it is denounced by the International Convention of 9 December 1948, consists of the destruction or the persecution of human groups conceived of as national, ethnic,
    racial or religious entities.
  2. The crime can be committed by the following acts: murder of members of the group, serious attack on the physical or
    mental integrity of members of the group, intentional submission of the group to conditions of existence which, by their very nature, will lead to its partial
    or total physical destruction, measures designed to prevent births within the group, and finally, forced transference of children from the group to another
    group.

Part 2. The crimes charged

General comment

The enunciation of the principal crimes condemned under inter national penal law, and with which the United States of America is charged, as this enunciation will be briefly made in this introductory report, can only constitute, at this stage of the debates, a statement of grievances, for which there is not yet any supporting evidence.

Each category of crimes will be dealt with in detailed reports, which will be accompanied, in each case, by supporting evidence.At the end of the discussions, and before the deliberation, a statement will be made, which
will sum up all the facts established in the course of the hearings.{71}

Crimes against the peace and wars of aggression

  1. When the Geneva Accords were signed in 1954, a legal settlement governing Vietnam was created. This legal settlement was accepted by all the interested parties, and by the
    general body of these nations.
  2. By using armed force to modify this legal settlement, the United States has replaced a state of peace with an
    armed conflict. Therefore, it bears the responsibility for the transition from the state of peace to the state of war, and it has consequently committed what
    is considered in international law to be a war of aggression, a crime against the peace.
  3. The nature of the Geneva Accords of July 1954 will be briefly recalled, that is, an agreement on the cessation of hostilities signed by the commander-in-chief of the People's Army of Vietnam and by the
    commander-in-chief of the forces of the French Union, followed by two declarations, the final declaration made by the various participants, and a declaration
    made by the United States representative.
  4. A brief summary will be made of the main provisions of the Geneva Accords, in particular those relating to the independence, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Vietnam, and also those stressing the temporary nature of the demarcation line, and the impossibility of its being interpreted as constituting a political and territorial boundary.
    There will also be reference to certain essential provisions of the Geneva Accords, namely the prohibition of any persecution arising from activities which took place during the preceding war, the prohibition on introducing
    new troops, military personnel, weapons and munitions, as well as the installation of military bases.
    Finally, mention will be made of the elections scheduled for July 1956, and the obligation to begin preparing them by undertaking contacts in July 1955.
  5. The foregoing provisions will be compared with the behaviour of the United States of America, and it will be pointed out that, beginning even before 1954, a certain number of actions already testified to the intention of the United States to seize Vietnam. In this connexion will be recalled the conditions under {72} which the United States set up the Diem government in Saigon a few weeks before the Geneva Accords.
    This confrontation will enable us to realize the progressive character of the American aggression, and of the successive violations of the Geneva Accords (persecution of former members of the resistance, refusal to hold the elections scheduled for 1956, introduction on a large scale of weapons and personnel, introduction of paid men).
  6. In the face of this aggression, the struggle of the people of South Vietnam until 1959 assumed the character of a national struggle against foreign intrusion, by taking the form only of a political struggle.
    It is only from 1959 on, and in face of the development of American aggression, that the struggle in the South took the form of an armed conflict, which was led, from 1960 on, by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.
  7. Finally, we will deal with the conditions in which American aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam took place, and also with the so-called politics of escalation, underlining the concomitant threat to peace in south-east Asia and throughout the world.
  8. We will stress the weakness of the arguments invoked by the United States in order to justify its activities, particularly as they are presented in the "juridical memorandum on the legality of United States participation in the defence of Vietnam" dated 4 March 1966, presented before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.
  9. The conclusion will be that the United States seems to have committed a crime against the peace, that is to say, it has waged a war of aggression in violation of both general and particular treaties, with the additional factor that, in this case, recourse to force is directed against the territorial integrity and political independence of a state - Vietnam - whose integrity and independence are recognized by the Geneva Accords.
  10. It is not only a question of a war of aggression which, like every war that sets out to settle an international dispute by force, is unlawful and criminal, but also a war of aggression conducted against the right to live of the Vietnamese people.
  11. The Nuremberg judgement rightly declared that a war of {73} aggression is the supreme international crime, since it contains within it all the other crimes. It is this crime that has been committed by the United States in Vietnam, but we Will see that it has been accompanied by numerous other crimes.

War crimes properly so called

  1. In this introductory report, we do not set out to recall in detail all the war crimes imputed to the American armed forces
    in the execution of its military operations.
  2. Massive, systematic and intentional bombing of the civilian population and of civilian objectives
    (hospitals, schools, churches, pagodas, etc ...). All information will be brought before the Tribunal dealing with the extraordinary extent of these bombings -
    which are regularly preceded by reconnaissance flights - and also with the quantity, nature and diversity of the devices employed. Among the witnesses who will
    give evidence on this question will be, in first place, the members of the investigating commissions who went to North Vietnam on behalf of the
    Tribunal.
  3. Policy of destruction, persecution and massacre in South Vietnam, in contempt of international rules on the treatment of civilian
    populations in occupied territories.
  4. Murders. tortures or harmful treatment inflicted upon prisoners of war in contempt of the provisions of the
    International Conventions of Geneva of 1949.(e) Besides the use of certain weapons or devices in unlawful conditions allowing the commission of the
    above-mentioned crimes, the use of new weapons of a patently "anti-personnel" nature, directed against civilian populations. In this regard, very
    special attention will be given to the so-called fragmentation bombs, which the Tribunal will be asked to declare to be prohibited weapons.
  5. Massive deportation of populations, and concentration in special camps created for this purpose. A detailed study of these camps (sometimes called "strategic hamlets") will be made, and they will be compared to the concentration camps organized by Germany during the last World War, and which
    were the object of the judgement at Nuremberg.
  6. A detailed study of the gases and toxic products employed {74} by the United States army will be
    made, including not only a scientific analysis of these products, but also the particular conditions under which they are used.

Crimes against humanity

  1. As we have recalled, crimes against humanity are distinguished, in fact, from war crimes only by their scope and by the intention to
    exterminate which inspires them.
  2. We believe that we can demonstrate to the Tribunal that the crimes we have just listed have had far-reaching
    consequences for the populations affected, and that they have been perpetrated with the obvious objective of exterminating one part of the population of
    Vietnam in order to force the other part into surrendering.

Genocide

The International Convention on genocide esteems that this crime is committed when a group of human beings. considered to be a national, ethnic or religious entity, is massacred or persecuted.

If all the crimes we have just listed (crimes against the peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity) are taken as a whole, one can say that, if one gives the most restricted interpretation to
the text on genocide, one is nevertheless dealing with such a crime.

This crime, which is the culmination of the war of aggression, and which includes all crimes perpetrated in conducting the war, constitutes an attempt to exterminate an entire nation.

Conclusion

The war being waged by the United
States in Vietnam, both in principle and in the way it is being executed, is criminal according to Positive International Law.

It has culminated in the crime of genocide, which has already been, and is still being, committed.

To have some idea of the contempt with which United States {75} representatives treat the question of the legality of their intervention in Vietnam, one has only to quote an interview given by Mr Henry Cabot Lodge, at that time United States Ambassador in Saigon. In the course of this interview, he replied as follows:

Question: Questions have recently been raised on the legal aspect of what we are doing in Vietnam. In what way are we justified by International Law?

Answer: As far as I'm concerned, the legal aspect of this affair is of no significance. ....1

Note

  1. US News and World Report, 15 February 1965.
Categories
Uncategorized

Aims of the Tribunal agreed at the Constituting Session, London, 15 November 1966

We constitute ourselves a Tribunal which, even if it has not the power to impose sanctions, will have to answer, amongst others, the following questions:

  1. Has the United States Government (and the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and South Korea) committed acts of aggression according to international law? {59}
  2. Has the American army made use of or experimented with new weapons or weapons forbidden by the laws of war?
  3. Has there been bombardment of targets of a purely civilian character, for example hospitals, schools, sanatoria, dams, etc., and on what scale has this occurred?
  4. Have Vietnamese prisoners been subjected to inhuman treatment forbidden by the laws of war and, in particular, to torture or mutilation? Have there been unjustified reprisals against the civilian population, in particular, execution of hostages?
  5. Have forced labour camps been created, has there been deportation of the population or other acts tending to the extermination of the population and which can be characterized juridically as acts of genocide?

This Tribunal will examine all the evidence that may be placed before it by any source or party. The evidence may be oral, or in the form of documents. No evidence relevant to our purposes will be refused attention. No witness competent to testify about the events with which our inquiry is concerned will be denied a hearing. The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have assured us of their willingness to cooperate, to provide the necessary information, and to help us in checking the accuracy and reliability of the information. The Cambodian Head of State, Prince Sihanouk, has similarly offered to help by the production of evidence. We trust that they will honour this pledge and we shall gratefully accept their help, without prejudice to our own views or attitudes. We renew, as a Tribunal, the appeal which Bertrand Russell has addressed in his name to the Government of the United States. We invite the Government of the United States to present evidence or cause it to be presented, and to instruct its officials or representatives to appear and state their case. Our purpose is to establish, without fear or favour, the full truth about this war. We sincerely hope that our efforts will contribute to the world's justice, to the re-establishment of peace and the liberation of oppressed peoples.

International War Crimes Tribunal1

NOTE

  1. A list of the members of the Tribunal can be found on p. 369. {60}{61}{62}


    Back to Table of Contents
Categories
Uncategorized

Foreword to the 1967 International War Crimes Tribunal

"We are not judges. We are witnesses. Our task is to make mankind bear witness to these terrible crimes and to unite humanity on the side of justice in Vietnam."

With these words, Bertrand Russell opened the second session of the International War Crimes Tribunal, in November 1967. The American people were given no opportunity, at that time, to bear witness to the terrible crimes recorded in the proceedings of the Tribunal. As Russell writes in the introduction to the first edition, '... it is in the nature of imperialism that citizens of the imperial power are always among the last to know - or care - about circumstances in the colonies'. The evidence brought before the Tribunal was suppressed by the self-censorship of the mass media, and its proceedings, when they appeared in print, were barely reviewed.

Russell wrote that 'it is in the United States that this book can have its most profound effect'. He expressed his faith in the essential decency of the American people, his faith that the ordinary man is not a gangster by nature, and will react in a civilized way when he is given the facts. We have yet to show that this faith is justified. Russell hoped to 'arouse consciousness in order to create mass resistance ... in the smug streets of Europe and the complacent cities of North America'. By now, there are few who can honestly claim to be unaware of the character of the American war in Vietnam. There are few, for example, who can now claim ignorance of the 'new Oradours and Lidices' described, in testimony to the Tribunal, by a West German physician who spent six years in Vietnam (see p.306). But consciousness has yet to create mass resistance. The streets of Europe and the cities of North America remain smug and complacent - with the {9} significant and honourable exception of the student youth. The record of the Tribunal stands as an eloquent and dramatic appeal to renounce the crime of silence. The crime was compounded by the silence that greeted its detailed documentation and careful studies. However, although no honest effort was made to deal with the factual record made public in the proceedings of the Tribunal, its work did receive some oblique response. The Pentagon was forced to admit that it was, indeed, using anti-personnel weapons in its attack against North Vietnam (though it could not resist the final lie that the targets were radar stations and anti-aircraft batteries). The hypocritical claim that the American bombing policy was one of magnificent restraint, that its targets were 'steel and concrete', was finally exploded beyond repair. A State Department functionary who had become an object of general contempt for his unending deceit regarding Vietnam demeaned himself still further by informing journalists that he had no intention of 'playing games with a 94-year-old Briton', referring tto one of the truly great men of the twentieth century. Those who were prepared to go beyond the mass media for information could learn something about the work of the Tribunal from such journals as Liberation, as could readers of the foreign press, in particular, Le Monde. The Tribunal Proceedings, along with the documentary study, In the Name of America, which appeared in the same year, and the honest and courageous work of many fine war correspondents, helped to crumble the defences erected by the government, with the partial collusion of the media, to keep the reality of the war from popular consciousness.

Though not reported honestly, the Tribunal was sharply criticized. Many of the criticisms are answered, effectively I believe, in Part 1 of this book. There are two criticisms that retain a certain validity, however. The participants, the 'jurors' and the witnesses, were undoubtedly biased. They made no attempt, in fact, to conceal this bias, this profound hatred of murder and wanton destruction carried out by a brutal foreign invader with unmatched technological resources.

A second and less frivolous criticism that might be raised is that the indictment is, in a sense, superfluous and redundant. This is a matter that deserves more serious attention.

The Pentagon will gladly supply, on request, such information {10} as the quantity of ordnance expended in Indochina. From 1965 through 1969 this amounts to about four and a half million tons by aerial bombardment. This is nine times the tonnage of bombing in the entire Pacific theatre in the Second World War, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki - 'over 70 tons of bombs for every square mile of Vietnam, North and South ... about 500 pounds of bombs for every man, woman and child in Vietnam'.1 The total of 'ordnance expended' is more than doubled when ground and naval attack are taken into account. With no further information than this, a person who has not lost his senses must realize that the war is an overwhelming atrocity.

A few weeks before the Tribunal began its second session, forty-nine volunteers of International Voluntary Services wrote a letter to President Johnson describing the war as 'an overwhelming atrocity'. Four of the staff leaders resigned. These volunteers had worked for many years in Vietnam. They were among the few Americans who had some human contact with the people of Vietnam. Their activities, and even the letter of protest, indicate their belief - surprisingly uncritical - in the legitimacy of the American effort in Vietnam.2 In this letter they refer to 'the free strike zones, the refugees, the spraying of herbicide on crops, the napalm . .. the deserted villages, the sterile valleys, the forests with the huge swaths cut out, and the long-abandoned rice checks'. They speak of the refugees 'forcibly resettled, landless, in isolated desolate places which are turned into colonies of mendicants'; of 'the Saigon slums, secure but ridden with disease and the compulsion towards crime'; of 'refugees generated not by Viet Cong terrorism, but by a policy, an American policy' - a process described by cynical American scholars as 'urbanization' or 'modernization'.

So effective is urbanization in Vietnam that Saigon is now estimated to have a population density more than twice that of {11} Tokyo. Experts in pacification ('peace researchers', to use the preferred term) assure us that 'the only sense in which [we have demolished the society of Vietnam] is the sense in which every modernizing country abandons reactionary traditionalism'.3 The methods of 'urbanization' are described, for example, by Orville and Jonathan Schell:

We both spent several weeks in Quang Ngai some six months before the [Song My] incident. We flew daily with the FACS (Forward Air Control). What we saw was a province utterly destroyed. In August 1967, during Operation Benton, the 'pacification' camps became so full that Army units were ordered not to 'generate' any more refugees. The Army complied. But search-and-destroy operations continued.

Only now peasants were not warned before an airstrike was called in on their villages because there was no room for them in the swamped pacification camps. The usual warning by helicopter loudspeaker or air-dropped leaflets were stopped. Every civilian on the ground was assumed to be enemy by the pilots by nature of living in Quang Ngai, which was largely a free-fire zone.

Pilots, servicemen not unlike Calley and Mitchell, continued to carry out their orders. Village after village was destroyed from the air as a matter of de facto policy. Airstrikes on civilians became a matter of routine. It was under these circumstances of official acquiescence to the destruction of the countryside and its people that the massacre of Song My occurred.

Such atrocities were and are the logical consequences of a war directed against an enemy indistinguishable from the people.4

Elsewhere, Orville Schell quotes a Newsweek correspondent returning from Quang Ngai: 'Having had experience in Europe during World War II, he said what he had seen was 'much worse than what the Nazis had done to Europe'.' Schell adds: 'Had he written about it in these terms? No.'5 Vietnamese-speaking field workers of the American Friends Service Committee describe more recent stages of modernization, as seen from the ground: {12}

In one such removal, during Operation Bold Mariner in January 1969, 12,000 peasants from the Batangan Peninsula were taken to a waterless camp near Quang Ngai over whose guarded gate floated a banner saying, 'We thank you for liberating us from communist terror.' These people had been given an hour to get out before the USS New Jersey began to shell their homes. After eight weeks of imprisonment they were ferried back to what was left of their villages, given a few sheets of corrugated metal and told to fend for themselves. When asked what they would live on until new crops could be raised, the Vietnamese camp commander said, 'Maybe they can fish.'6

Reports by Western observers are limited to areas more or less under American control. The most intensive attacks are therefore unreported in the West. We do, however, have Vietnamese reports, which will, perhaps, be given somewhat greater credence than heretofore now that the incident at Song My, which they described with accuracy at the time, has finally been made public. To select one such report virtually at random:

In Trang Bang on the evening of October 24 [1969], three flights of B52s made three sorties, killing 47 people, wounding many others (mostly children, and old folks), completely levelling 450 houses and devastating 650 hectares of fields. On the night of October 25, B52s flew nine attacks in Quang Tri and Quang Nam provinces, dumping more than 1,000 tons of bombs, killing 300 people, wounding 236 others, setting afire 564 houses and damaging hundreds of hectares of fields and orchards. In Pleiku, a fertile region, many flights of B52s came in on the morning of October 17 and released 700 tons of bombs which wrought havoc in hundreds of hectares of fields and orchards ...

In the area of Nui Ba and the villages of Ninh Thanh, Hiep Ninh Thanh, Hiep Ninh of the Tay Ninh Cao Dai persuasion, the US puppets resorted to toxic chemicals to destroy the crops and kill civilians. American hovercraft dumped tens of thousands of CS cans while helicopters dropped hundreds of thousands of toxic bombs on the villages. Moreover, enemy guns and mortars fired more than 5,000 gas shells affecting over 1,000 people, with 13 children under 13 killed (Ninh Thanh and Hiep Ninh villages) and more than 100 hectares of crops completely destroyed.7

{13} And on and on, without end.

The facts are, of course, familiar in a general way to the highest authorities in the United States. The Under Secretary of the Air Force, Townsend Hoopes, wrote a memorandum in March 1968 in which he pointed out that:

...ARVN and US forces in the towns and cities are now responding to mortar fire from nearby villages by the liberal use of artillery and air strikes. This response is causing widespread destruction and heavy civilian casualties - among people who were considered only a few weeks ago to be secure elements of the GVN constituency. ... The present mode and tempo of operations in SVN is already destroying cities, villages and crops, and is creating civilian casualties at an increasing rate.8

He describes the savage American reaction to the conquest of many cities by the NLF in the Tet offensive in January 1968 - for example, in Saigon, where in an effort to dislodge the 1,000 soldiers who had taken the city, 'artillery and air strikes were repeatedly used against densely populated areas of the city, causing heavy civilian casualties'; or in Hue, where the American reoccupation left 'a devastated and prostrate city'. 'Eighty per cent of the buildings had been reduced to rubble, and in the smashed ruins lay 2,000 dead civilians.9 ... Three quarters of the city's {14} people were rendered homeless and looting was widespread, members of the ARVN being the worst offenders'. Elsewhere, the story was much the same:

Everywhere, the US-ARVN forces mounted counterattacks of great severity. In the delta region below Saigon, half of the city of Mytho, with a population of 70,000, was destroyed by artillery and air strikes in an effort to eject a strong VC force. In Ben Tre on 7 February, at least 1,000 civilians were killed and 1,500 wounded in an effort to dislodge 2,500 VC.

According to Hoopes, the combat photographer David Douglas Duncan, whose war experience covers the Second World War, Korea, Algeria and the French war in Vietnam, 'was appalled by the US-ARVN method of freeing Hue'. He quotes him as saying:

The Americans pounded the Citadel and surrounding city almost to dust with air strikes, napalm runs, artillery and naval gunfire, and the direct cannon fire from tanks and recoilless rifles a total effort to root out and kill every enemy soldier. The mind reels at the carnage, cost, and ruthlessness of it all.

Hoopes also reports that a 'sizable part' of the PAVN force of 1,000 escaped. Compare the figures on casualties, cited above.

These events occurred too late to be considered by the Tribunal. I need not elaborate on what has been revealed since. Some indications are given in my book, After Pinkville. For far more, see the book by Edward Herman, cited in footnote 1 on p. 11.

I have mentioned all of this in connexion with the question, raised earlier, as to whether it is necessary, today, to publicize the detailed reports of the Tribunal. Is it not true that by now the monstrous character of the war has penetrated the American consciousness so fully that further documentation is superfluous? Unfortunately, the answer must be negative. To see why, consider again the case of Townsend Hoopes, who is now a leading 'dove'. {15}

A reviewer of his book in the New York Times describes it as the most persuasive presentation of the case for American withdrawal from Vietnam. It is instructive to compare his position with that of the 'hawks' on the one hand, and that of the Tribunal, on the other. Such a comparison shows how narrow is the gap between the 'hawks' and the 'doves', and how far removed the dove-hawk position still remains from the consciousness that Russell hoped would be aroused by the factual record and historical and legal argument of the Tribunal. I want to stress that Hoopes's is one of the most humane and enlightened voices to be heard within the mainstream of American opinion today, surely among those who have had any significant role in the formation and implementation of policy. For this reason, his views are important and deserve careful consideration.

America's early strategy, as Hoopes describes it, was to kill as many VC as possible with artillery and air strikes:

As late as the fall of 1966... a certain aura of optimism surrounded this strategy. Some were ready to believe that, in its unprecedented mobility and massive firepower, American forces had discovered the military answer to endless Asian manpower and Oriental indifference to death. For a few weeks there hung in the expectant Washington air the exhilarating possibility that the most modern, mobile, professional American field force in the nation's history was going to lay to rest the time-honoured superstition, the gnawing unease of military planners, that a major land war against Asian hordes is by definition a disastrous plunge into quicksand for any Western army.

But this glorious hope was dashed. The endless manpower of Vietnam, the Asian hordes with their Oriental indifference to death, confounded our strategy. And our bombing of North Vietnam also availed us little, given the nature of the enemy. As Hoopes explains, quoting a senior US Army officer: 'Caucasians cannot really imagine what ant labour can do.' In short, our strategy was rational, but it presupposed civilized Western values:

We believe the enemy can be forced to be 'reasonable', i.e. to compromise or even capitulate, because we assume he wants to avoid pain, death, and material destruction. We assume that if these are inflicted on him with increasing severity, then at some point in the process he will want to stop the suffering. Ours is a plausible strategy - for those who are rich, who love life and fear pain. But happiness, wealth, and {16} power are expectations that constitute a dimension far beyond the experience, and probably beyond the emotional comprehension, of the Asian poor.

Hoopes does not tell us how he knows that the Asian poor do not love life or fear pain, or that happiness is probably beyond their emotional comprehension.10 But he does go on to explain how 'ideologues in Asia' make use of these characteristics of the Asian hordes. Their strategy is to convert 'Asia's capacity for endurance in suffering into an instrument for exploiting a basic vulnerability of the Christian West'. They do this by inviting the West 'to carry its strategic logic to the final conclusion, which is genocide'. The Asians thus 'defy us by a readiness to struggle, suffer, and die on a scale that seems to us beyond the bounds of humanity.... At that point we hesitate, for, remembering Hitler and Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we realize anew that genocide is a terrible burden to bear.'

Thus by their willingness to die, the Asian hordes, who do not love life, who fear no pain and cannot conceive of happiness, exploit our basic weakness, our Christian values which make us reluctant to bear the burden of genocide, the final conclusion of our strategic logic. Is it really possible that one can read these passages without being stunned by the crudity and callousness?

Let us continue. Seeing that our strategy, though plausible, has failed, the Air Force Staff worked out several alternative strategies, which they presented to the new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, in March 1968. The Air Staff preferred the following:

an intensified bombing campaign in the North, including attacks on the dock area of Haiphong, on railroad equipment within the Chinese Buffer Zone, and on the dike system that controlled irrigation for NVN agriculture.

But Hoopes and Air Force Secretary Harold Brown demurred. Why? They felt 'there was little assurance such a campaign could either force NVN to the conference table, or even significantly reduce its war effort'; furthermore, 'it was a course embodying {17} excessive risks of confrontation with Russia'. If they had any other objections to intensified bombing of the dike system of NVN, Hoopes does not inform us of them.11 Hoopes himself preferred, rather, the following tactics:

a campaign designed to substitute tactical airpower for a large portion of the search-and-destroy operations currently conducted by ground forces, thus permitting the ground troops to concentrate on a perimeter defence of the heavily populated areas ... the analysis seemed to show that tactical air-power could provide a potent 'left jab' to keep the enemy in the South off balance while the US-ARVN ground forces adopted a modified enclaves strategy, featuring enough aggressive reconnaissance to identify and break up developing attacks, but designed primarily to protect the people of Vietnam and, by population control measures, to force exposure of the VC political cadres.12

In a letter of 12 February 1968 to Clark Clifford, Hoopes explains his preferences in similar terms. We should, he urges, stop the militarily insignificant bombing of North Vietnam and undertake a less ambitious ground strategy in the South, trying merely to control (the technical term is 'protect') the populated areas. This policy:

would give us a better chance to develop a definable geographical {18} area of South Vietnamese political and economic stability; and by reducing the intensity of the war tempo, it could materially improve the prospect of our staying the course for an added number of grinding years without rending our own society... .

Compare these recommendations with the tactics now being followed by the Nixon administration. Secretary of the Army Resor, testifying before the House Appropriations Committee,13 refused to predict how long the war would last, but he sees time as 'running on our side':

Therefore, if we can just buy some time in the US by these periodic progressive withdrawals and the American people can just shore up their patience and determination, I think we can bring this to a successful conclusion.

To this remark General Westmoreland added: 'I have never made the prediction that this would be other than a long war.'

Thus the present Secretary of the Army agrees with the Hoopes letter of February 1968, that we may be able to stay the course for 'an added number of grinding years' if the American people will consent, if this policy will not rend our own society. And with this judgement, finally, Mr Hoopes disagrees:

Vietnam is not of course the only source of division in America today, but it is the most pervasive issue of our discord, the catalytic agent that stimulates and magnifies all other divisive issues. In particular, there can be no real truce between the generations - no end to the bitterness and alienation of even the large majority of our youth that is neither revolutionary nor irresponsible - until Vietnam is terminated.

This is the primary reason why, he urges, we must withdraw from Vietnam.

So the hawks and the doves divide: can the American people stay the course until victory, or will the polarization and discord in American society make this effort inadvisable, not in our national interest?

I do not want to suggest that the spectrum from Hoopes to Resor exhausts the contemporary debate over Vietnam, but there is little doubt that it represents the range of views and {19} assumptions expressed within the mainstream of 'responsible' American opinion. With this observation, we can return to the Tribunal. Its assumptions, of course, fall entirely outside of this spectrum. It is unfortunate, but undeniable, that the central issue in the American debate over Vietnam, in respectable circles, has been the question: can we win at an acceptable cost? The doves and the hawks disagree. Hawks become doves as their assessment of the probabilities and costs shifts, and if the American conquest were to prove successful, they would, no doubt, resume their former militancy. The Tribunal is concerned with very different questions. It does not ask whether the US can win at an acceptable cost, but rather whether it should win, whether it should be involved at all in the internal affairs of the Vietnamese, whether it has any right to try to settle or even influence these internal matters by force. Until this becomes the unique and overriding issue, within the United States, the debate over Vietnam will not even have begun.

Inevitably, despite disclaimers, the Russell Tribunal will evoke memories of Nuremberg and Tokyo. With the revelation of the Song My atrocities, the issues raised in the War Crimes trials have become, at last, a matter of public concern. We can hardly suppress the memory of our initiative at Nuremberg and Tokyo, or the explicit insistence of the US prosecutor, Robert Jackson, that the principles of Nuremberg are to be regarded as universal in their applicability. After the trials, he wrote:

If certain acts and violations of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them. We are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us.14

It might be argued that the verdict of Nuremberg and Tokyo was merely the judgement of victors, who sought vengeance and retribution rather than justice. I think there is merit in this accusation, but - right or wrong - it does not affect the broader question of the legitimacy of the principles that were recognized in the Charter of the War Crimes Tribunals. Legal niceties aside, the citizen is justified in taking these principles as his guide. {20}

A classic liberal doctrine holds that: 'Generally speaking, it is the drawn sword of the nation which checks the physical power of its rulers.'15 It is the fundamental duty of the citizen to resist and to restrain the violence of the state. Those who choose to disregard this responsibility can justly be accused of complicity in war crimes, which is itself designated as 'a crime under international law' in the principles of the Charter of Nuremberg. This is, in essence, the challenge posed to us by the Russell Tribunal.

Richard A. Falk has written about this matter in an important recent article.16 He points out that 'Song My stands out as a landmark atrocity in the history of warfare, and its occurrence is a moral challenge to the entire American society'. Nevertheless, it would 'be misleading to isolate the awful happenings at Song My from the overall conduct of the war'. Among the war policies that might, he argues, be found illegal, are these: '(1) the Phoenix Programme; (2) aerial and naval bombardment of undefended villages; (3) destruction of crops and forests; (4) 'search-and-destroy' missions; (5) 'harassment and interdiction' fire; (6) forcible removal of civilian population; (7) reliance on a variety of weapons prohibited by treaty.' That these policies have been followed, on a massive scale, is not in question. Falk argues that: 'if found to be 'illegal', such policies should be discontinued forthwith and those responsible for the policy and its execution should be prosecuted as war criminals by appropriate tribunals'. He also notes how broad was the conception of criminal responsibility developed, under American initiative, in the War Crimes Trials. In Falk's paraphrase, the majority judgement of the Tokyo Tribunal held as follows:

A leader must take affirmative acts to prevent war crimes or dissociate himself from the government. If he fails to do one or the other, then by the very act of remaining in a government or a state guilty of war crimes, he becomes a war criminal.

And Falk emphasizes the obligation of resistance for the citizen, if {21} the evidence is strong that the state is engaged in criminal acts.

It is correct, but irrelevant, to stress the vast differences in the political processes of America and the fascist states. It is correct, but hardly relevant, to point out that the United States has stopped short of carrying 'its strategic logic to the final conclusion, which is genocide' (Hoopes). Thus one cannot compare American policy to that of Nazi Germany, as of 1942. It would be more difficult to argue that American policy is not comparable to that of fascist Japan, or of Germany prior to the 'final solution'. There may be those who are prepared to tolerate any policy less ghastly than crematoria and death camps and to reserve their horror for the particular forms of criminal insanity perfected by the Nazi technicians. Others will not lightly disregard comparisons which, though harsh, may well be accurate.

Nazi Germany was sui generis, of that there is no doubt. But we should have the courage and honesty to face the question whether the principles applied to Nazi Germany and fascist Japan do not, as well, apply to the American war in Vietnam. Recall the objectives of 'denazification', as formulated by those who were responsible for this policy. General Lucius D. Clay, in 1950, described the primary objective as follows: 'to safeguard the new German democracy from Nazi influence and to make it possible for anti-Nazi, non-Nazi and outspoken democratic individuals to enter public life and replace the Nazi elements which had dominated all life in Germany from 1933 to 1945'.17 He reports that:

This was, perhaps, the most extensive legal procedure the world had ever witnessed. In the US Zone alone more than 13 million persons had been involved, of whom over three and two-thirds million were found chargeable, and of these some 800,000 persons were made subject to penalty for their party affiliations or actions. All this was, of course, apart from the punishment of war criminals many of whom were high-ranking Nazis.

Field-Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery saw the objective of the allied forces in Germany as 'to change the heart, and the way of life, of the German people'. Denazification involved a cultural and ideological change, to proceed side-by-side with economic reconstruction.18 {22} We can certainly ask whether three and two-thirds million Germans in the US Zone were more guilty of complicity in war crimes than any Americans. And we can ask whether a cultural and ideological change in the United States, at the very least, is not imperative if many others, who fear neither pain nor death, are not to be spared the fate of Vietnam.

Some of these questions arise in a revealing exchange between Townsend Hoopes and two young journalists who published an interview with him in the Village Voice (see note 14 above). Hoopes insisted that:

War crimes tribunals would be the worst thing that could happen in this country. That would amount to McCarthyism. You're proposing a system of legal guilt for top elected officials. The traditional way to deal with these top officials is to throw the rascals out.

In an article in which he comments on 'the curious piece of reporting' of Coburn and Cowan, Hoopes explains further that 'a democratic and an entirely elective form of retribution' has already been visited upon Lyndon Johnson, and that his 'closest collaborators' may also be excluded from high office.19 Hoopes does not say whether this form of 'retribution' would also have been more appropriate in the case of the Japanese and German war criminals should the West, then, merely have guaranteed a democratic election in which they might have been deprived of office? He does, however, reject the suggestion that civilian officials be held accountable for such incidents as the Song My massacre, or for the bombing of North Vietnam, or for such policies as those enumerated by Falk, cited above. In fact, Coburn and Cowan report that 'in the friendliest possible terms, he accused our 'generation' of wanting to impose a totalitarian system of morality' which would lead to 'universal anarchy'. Coburn and Cowan, in turn, ask:

If Tojo can be sentenced to be executed by an American war crimes tribunal for leading Japan into a 'war of aggression', should the only punishment for an American President be that he is voted out of office while his Secretary of Defense serves a secure term as President of the World Bank?

This seems a not unreasonable question, certainly not unreasonable for those who take seriously the statement of Justice Jackson, quoted earlier. Nor do Coburn and Cowan appear unreasonable when they add that: 'The 'anarchists' who frighten us most are those who wield the big bombs, control the courts, and assume for themselves the power to declare all their enemies outlaws.'

Hoopes strongly disagrees. It is these strange conclusions that make the Coburn-Cowan article such 'a curious piece of reporting'. To him it is 'crystal clear ... that such views could not conceivably be held or expressed by anyone who was a young man during the Second World War or who was engaged in the mortal struggles of its aftermath - in Greece, in Germany, in Berlin, in Korea'. Only 'sensitive, clever children' could be moved to such harsh judgements, 'unshaped by historical perspective and untempered by any first-hand experience with the unruly forces at work in this near-cyclonic century'. Those who designed our Vietnam policy were 'struggling in good conscience to uphold the Constitution and to serve the broad national interest according to their lights'; they were, 'almost uniformly, those considered when they took office to be among the ablest, the best, the most humane and liberal men that could be found for public trust', and 'no one doubted their honest, high-minded pursuit of the best interests of their country, and indeed of the whole non-Communist world, as they perceived these interests'. To be sure, they were deluded by the 'tensions of the Cold War years'. The tragedy of Vietnam, as he sees it, is that these good men were unable to perceive that the triumph of the national revolution in Vietnam would be 'neither a triumph for Moscow and Peking nor a disaster for the United States'. Furthermore, their policies received wide public support. 'Set against these facts, the easy designation of individuals as deliberate or imputed 'war criminals' is shockingly glib, even if one allows for the inexperience of the young.' Similarly, it would be 'absurd' even to ask whether a war crimes tribunal, even in principle, should try Nixon and Kissinger as 'war criminals' (even though they continue to 'buy some time in the US' so that the war can be brought 'to a successful conclusion', in the words of the present Secretary of the Army).

One should, I believe, agree with Townsend Hoopes that 'what the country needs is not retribution, but therapy in the form of {24} deeper understanding of our problems and of each other'. No one, to my knowledge, has urged that those responsible for the massacre of the people of Vietnam, their forced evacuation from their homes,20 and the destruction of their country, be jailed or executed, or even that 'denazification' procedures of the sort instituted against thirteen million Germans in the US Zone be applied to the American population. Let us, by all means, try rather to achieve a deeper understanding of our problems. Among these problems is the fact that one of the most liberal and enlightened commentators on contemporary affairs can assure us that Asian hordes care nothing of death, fear no pain and cannot conceive of happiness, while as for us - it is our Christian values that impel us to stop short of a final solution. Among our problems is the fact that the same spokesman can summon up the kind of 'historical perspective' that sees our intervention in Greece, in the 1940s, as a 'mortal struggle' (against whom?); or the fact that those who were, quite possibly, the most humane and liberal men that could be found for public trust could set out to annihilate the Vietnamese in the belief (whether honest or feigned - it hardly matters) that they were combating a communist monolith that included 'Moscow and Peking' (in 1965!). One of our problems is the doctrine developed by Mr Hoopes, in accordance with which - to take his words literally - no policy carried out by the best American leaders with wide public support could be criminal, could in principle demand any response other than 'to throw the rascals out'.

In fact, is it not a trifle naive (or even 'glib') of Mr Hoopes to suggest that we throw the rascals out? Did we vote the rascals in? Richard Barnet, in a recent study, writes:

Most of the men who have set the framework of America's national-security policy, as I found when I studied the background of the top 400 decision-makers, have come from executive suites and law offices {25} within shouting distance of one another in fifteen city blocks in New York, Washington, Detroit, Chicago, and Boston. It is not surprising that they emerge from homogeneous backgrounds and virtually identical careers with a standard way of looking at the world. They may argue with one another about means but not about ends.21

No one who considers carefully the role of the executive in civil-military decisions in the post-war world, or the role of the private economic empires in determining national policy (either in their own protected domain, or within the parliamentary system itself), or the kinds of choices presented by the two competing candidate-producing organizations can so easily speak of 'throwing the rascals out'. It would require social revolution, leading to a redistribution of power throughout the industrial as well as the political system, for a significant change to take place in the top decision-making positions in American society. For this reason alone, one must fully accept the judgement that 'what the country needs is not retribution, but therapy in the form of deeper understanding of our problems' - and appropriate action to remedy these problems, which, given our enormous power, are problems of life and death for a good part of the world.

These problems should be on the agenda for any thinking person. More immediate, however, is the problem of bringing about a withdrawal of American force from Vietnam. There is no indication that any such policy is envisioned, at present. Rather, it is clear that the US government is hoping to stay the course until victory is achieved, adjusting tactics, where necessary, to buy some time at home. For this reason, the Proceedings of the Tribunal is a document of first importance; the spirit and convictions that underlie it must, as Russell hoped, become a part of the consciousness of all Americans.

Richard Falk concludes the article I quoted earlier, writing:

Given the perils and horrors of the contemporary world, it is time that individuals everywhere called their government to account for indulging or ignoring the daily evidences of barbarism... the obsolete pretensions of sovereign prerogative and military necessity had better be challenged soon if life on earth is to survive.

The Tribunal takes one step - small, perhaps, but significant. The Tribunal, or another like it, should turn to Czechoslovakia, to Greece, to a dozen other countries that are suffering in the grip of the imperialist powers or the local forces that they support and maintain. Still more important, the work initiated by the Tribunal should be carried further by groups of citizens who take upon themselves the duty of discovering and making public the daily evidences of barbarism, and the still more severe duty of challenging the powers - state or private - that are responsible for violence and oppression, looking forward to the day when an international movement for freedom and social justice will end their rule. {27}{28}

Notes

  1. Edward S. Herman, 'Atrocities' in Vietnam: Myths and Realities (Pilgrim Press, 1970). In a careful analysis, he estimates South Vietnamese civilian casualties at over a million dead, over two million wounded, and he notes that two years ago the total number of refugees 'generated' mainly by the American scorched earth policy was estimated at almost four million by the Kennedy Committee of the 90th Congress.Back
  2. The letter appears as an Appendix in Don Luce and John Sommer, Vietnam: the Unheard Voices (Cornell University Press, 1969).Back
  3. Ithiel Pool, New York Review of Books, 13 February 1969, letters.Back
  4. New York Times, letter, 26 November 1969. The war in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin provinces is described in unforgettable detail by Jonathan Schell, The Military Half (Vintage Books, 1968).Back
  5. 'Pop me some dinks', New Republic, 3 January 1970.Back
  6. Vietnam: 1969, AFSC White Paper, 5 May 1969, 160 N. 15th Street, Philadelphia, Penna. 19102.Back
  7. South Viet Nam: The Struggle, publication of the NLF Information Commission, No.48, 15 November 1969.Back
  8. Limits of Intervention (McKay, 1969).Back
  9. The NLF claims that 2,000 victims of the American bombardment were buried in mass graves (see Wilfred Burchett, Guardian, 6 December 1969). This is consistent with Hoopes's account. Hoopes states that, after ten days of fighting, 300 local officials and prominent citizens were found in a mass grave. This corresponds roughly with the estimate of Police Chief Doan Cong Lap, who estimated the total number executed as 200; he also gives the figure of 3,776 civilian casualties in the battle of Hue (Stewart Harris, The Times, 27 March 1968). Apart from Harris, I know of only one journalist who has given a detailed eye-witness report from Hue at the time, namely Marc Riboud. US authorities were unable to show him the mass graves reported by the US mission. Riboud reports 4,000 civilians killed during the reconquest of the 'assassinated city' of Hue (Le Monde, 13 April 1968). AFSC staff people in Hue were unable to confirm the reports of mass graves, though they reported many civilians shot and killed during the reconquest of the city (see the report by John Sullivan of AFSC, 9 May 1968). For attempts to evaluate government propaganda on mass killings in Hue, see D. Gareth Porter and Len E. Ackland, 'Vietnam: the bloodbath argument', Christian Century, 5 November 1969; Vietnam International, December 1969 (6 Endsleigh Street, London, W.C.1); Tran Van Dinh, 'Fear of a bloodbath', New Republic, 6 December 1969. The only other accounts I have seen merely convey information given out by American government sources.Back
  10. This is not quite accurate. He does provide a brief philosophical discussion of Buddhist beliefs, which tend 'to create a positive impetus towards honourable death'.Back
  11. As Gabriel Kolko notes, in testimony to the Tribunal, the barbarism of Seyss-Inquart in opening the dikes in Holland was considered one of the most monstrous crimes of the Second World War, and was prominent among the charges that led to his death sentence at Nuremberg. Note also Kolko's discussion of the bombing of dikes in the Korean war, and the testimony given regarding American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. Eye-witness reports of the bombing of dikes in the Red River Delta have appeared in the American press. See Christian Science Monitor, 8 September 1967, quoted in my American Power and the New Mandarins (Chatto & Windus, 1969), p.15.Back
  12. As we know from other sources, the VC political cadres thus 'exposed' were to be eliminated by 'Operation Phoenix', which, in the year 1968, is claimed to have killed 18,393 persons. See Senator Charles E. Goodell, New Republic, 22 November 1969 (cited in Herman, op. cit.), and also Judith Coburn and Geoffrey Cowan, 'Training for terror: a deliberate policy?', Village Voice, 11 December 1969. On 'population control measures', see William Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam (Praeger, 1967). For earlier precedents during the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, see my American Power and the New Mandarins, pp. 195-203.Back
  13. 8 October 1969, released 2 December. Quoted in I. F. Stone's Weekly, 15 December 1969.Back
  14. Quoted in an article to which I return in a moment: Judith Coburn and Geoffrey Cowan, 'The war criminals hedge their bets', Village Voice, 4 December 1969.Back
  15. Wilhelm von Humboldt, The Limits of State Action, 1792 (Cambridge University Press, 1969), J. W. Burrow (ed.).Back
  16. 'The circle of responsibility', The Nation, 26 January 1970. Falk is Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton University.Back
  17. The Present State of Denazification, reprinted in Constantine Fitzgibbon, Denazification (Norton, 1969).Back
  18. Fitzgibbon, op. cit.Back
  19. 'The Nuremberg Suggestion', Washington Monthly, January 1970. Noam Chomsky.Back
  20. Coburn and Cowan report the views of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who says in a statement to Congress on the refugee situation that the figures may be misleading, since the war-torn Vietnamese are used to disruption and 'have been moving around for centuries'. Since this is true, to a far greater extent, of the American population, there would presumably be even less reason to protest, if they were driven from their homes by a foreign invader.Back
  21. The Economy of Death (Atheneum, 1969). See also the detailed analysis by Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy(Beacon Press, 1969), Chapter 1.Back
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Speech to the First Meeting of Members of the War Crimes Tribunal, London, 13 November 1966

Allow me to express my appreciation to you for your willingness to participate in this Tribunal. It has been convened so that we may investigate and assess the character of the United States' war in Vietnam.

The Tribunal has no clear historical precedent. The Nuremberg Tribunal, although concerned with designated war crimes, was possible because the victorious allied Powers compelled the vanquished to present their leaders for trial. Inevitably, the Nuremberg trials, supported as they were by state power, contained a strong element of realpolitik. Despite these inhibiting factors, which call in question certain of the Nuremberg procedures, the Nuremberg Tribunal expressed the sense of outrage, which was virtually universal, at the crimes committed by the Nazis in Europe. Somehow, it was widely felt, there had to be criteria against which such actions could be judged, and according to which Nazi crimes could be condemned. Many felt it was morally necessary to record the full horror. It was hoped that a legal method could be devised, capable of coming to terms with the magnitude of Nazi crimes. These ill-defined but deeply felt sentiments surrounded the Nuremberg Tribunal.

Our own task is more difficult, but the same responsibility obtains. We do not represent any state power, nor can we compel the policy-makers responsible for crimes against the people of Vietnam to stand accused before us. We lack force majeure. The procedures of a trial are impossible to implement.

I believe that these apparent limitations are, in fact, virtues. We are free to conduct a solemn and historic investigation, uncompelled {57} by reasons of state or other such obligations. Why is this war being fought in Vietnam? In whose interest is it being waged? We have, I am certain, an obligation to study these questions and to pronounce on them, after thorough investigation, for in doing so we can assist mankind in understanding why a small agrarian people have endured for more than twelve years the assault of the largest industrial power on earth, possessing the most developed and cruel military capacity.

I have prepared a paper, which I hope you will wish to read during your deliberations. It sets out a considerable number of reports from Western newspapers and such sources, giving an indication of the record of the United States in Vietnam. These reports should make it clear that we enter our inquiry with considerable prima facie evidence of crimes reported not by the victims but by media favourable to the policies responsible. I believe that we are justified in concluding that it is necessary to convene a solemn Tribunal, composed of men eminent not through their power, but through their intellectual and moral contribution to what we optimistically call ‘human civilizationÂ'.

Categories
All in the Mind Power Dynamics

By persuasion if we can, but by coercion if we must!

The liberal media's reaction to reports of widespread abuse and torture of Iraqi detainees by US and UK military personnal marks a psychological turning point in the current phase in the sole superpower's war for total global domination.

Recent interventions have been justified in one way or another by our moral superiority, our more advanced, more humane form of civilisation, our crusade to spread democracy and liberal values. Whatever the crimes committed by high-tech weapons systems, whatever the abuses carried out at Guantanamo Bay, whatever the evidence of CIA-funding for the KLA or Al Qaeda, whatever the flaws in the allegations made against the former Yugoslav government, Britain - we were told - represented a beacon of justice and fairness.

No sooner had our brave service men and women liberated a new territory, the liberal media progressed to stage two, reconstruction via international bank loans and rehabilitation via NGOs. British experts would be sent all over the globe to teach our enlightened ways to people accustomed for so long to only dictatorships (with whom we used to do business). Thus for paid intellectuals like Johann Hari of the Independent or David Aaronovitch and Nick Cohen of the Guardian, new military adventures provided a new opportunity to spread our values.

Wouldn't it just be wonderful if the whole world became a multi-hued mosaic of dominant post-1980s Anglo-American culture? Sure McDonalds would localise its burgers for the Mid East market, MTV would broadcast some Arabic rap, juicier scenes from Hollywood movies would be edited out and people would speak English with different accents and continue to learn local dialects for a couple more generations. But rest assured your Lonely Planet Guide to Iraq will feature an extensive list of gay nightclubs in downtown Baghdad. Okay Iraqis may have more traditional values now, but given time greater exposure to our benign media will usher in a new era of carefree hedonism.

US and UK crimes could easily be brushed aside by stressing the repressive nature of all local or nationalist alternatives. So pundits would opine that we need to stay the course in Iraq to stop Islamic extremists or Saddam Loyalists from (re)gaining power. Democracy has only one meaning: A pacified electorate happy to vote for responsible politicians who collaborate fully with the international community as defined by the Coalition.

To understand the chasm emerging within our ruling elite witness yesterday's Scottish Daily Record and UK Daily Express - not a word about US and UK crimes, just a page two article about Moqtaba Al-Sadr's threat to use captured female British soldiers as slaves. Then read the liberal press. The underlying message is Abu Ghraib represents a setback for the spread of our civilisation, very bad PR. Now the damage has been done, a section of the ruling elite, the same opinion-makers who campaigned passionately for humanitarian wars, want our troops out. But the die has already been cast. Withdrawal will leave the US in a significantly weaker position in the Middle East than it enjoyed in February 2003. Whether or not, US and UK armed forces retreat strategically, their dependence on near absolute control of the world's oil reserves is so great that they will just seek new and devious means.

It's time the left gatekeepers, as some call the likes of Greg Palast (who thinks the Beeb allows objective reporting), started challenging assumptions about our moral superiority and start publicly admitting rather than merely implying the real motivations for war. Torture and violence are not unAmerican any more than they are unChinese or unArabic. They are classic tools of conquest. As Madeleine Albright said "We will act multilaterally when we can, unilaterally when we must."

Let's paraphrase that: We will act by gentle persuasion where we can and by physical coercion and advanced brainwashing techniques where we must. What the liberal media is telling us is that the era of gentle persuasion is nearing its end.

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Inaugural Statement

Our Tribunal was formed, on the initiative of Lord Bertrand Russell, to decide whether the accusations of ‘war crimesÂ' levelled against the government of the United States as well as against those of South Korea, New Zealand and Australia, during the conflict in Vietnam, are justified.

During this inaugural session, the origin, function, aims and limits of the Tribunal must be clarified: the Tribunal means to explain itself, without sidetracking, on the question of what has been called its ‘legitimacyÂ'.

In 1945, something absolutely new in history appeared at Nuremberg with the first international Tribunal formed to pass judgement on crimes committed by a belligerent power. Until then there had been a few international agreements, for instance the Briand-Kellogg pact, which were aimed at limiting the jus ad bellum; but as no other body had been created to implement them, the relations between the powers continued to operate under the law of the jungle. It could not be otherwise: the nations which had built their wealth upon the conquest of great colonial empires would not have tolerated being judged upon their actions in Africa or Asia.

From 1939, the Hitlerian furies had endangered the world to such an extent that the horrified Allies decided, since they were to be the victors, to judge and condemn the wars of aggression and conquest, the maltreatment of prisoners and the tortures, as well as the racist practices known as ‘genocideÂ', unaware that they were condemning themselves, in this way, for their own actions in the colonies.

For this reason, that is to say because they were recognizing the Nazi crimes, and because, in the more universal sense, they were opening the way to a real jurisdiction for the denunciation and {63} condemnation of war crimes wherever committed, and whoever the culprits, the Tribunal of Nuremberg is still the manifestation of a change of capital importance: the substitution of jus ad bellum by jus contra bellum.

Unfortunately, as is wont to happen whenever a new force is created by historical exigencies, this Tribunal was not free from serious faults. It has been said that it was a diktat of the victors to the vanquished and, which comes to the same thing, that it was not really being international: one group of nations was judging another. Would it have been more worthwhile to have taken the judges from neutral countries? I cannot say. What is certain, however, is that, although the decisions were perfectly just by ethical standards, they did not convince all Germans. The legitimacy of the magistrates and their sentences is contested to this day. Also, it has been declared that, if the fortunes of war had been otherwise, a tribunal of the Axis could have condemned the Allies for the bombing of Dresden or for that of Hiroshima.

Such a body would not have been difficult to set up. It would have sufficed that the body created for the judgement of the Nazis had continued after its original task, or that the United Nations, considering all the consequences of what had just been achieved, would, by a vote of the General Assembly, have consolidated it into a permanent tribunal, empowered to investigate and to judge all accusations of war crimes, even if the accused should be one of the countries that had been responsible for the sentencing at Nuremberg. In this way, the implicit universality of the original intention would have been clearly defined. However, we know what did happen: hardly had the last guilty German been sentenced than the Tribunal vanished and no one ever heard of it again.

Are we therefore so pure? Have there been no war crimes since 1945? Have we never had further resort to violence or to aggression? Have there been no more ‘genocidesÂ'? Has no large country ever tried to break by force the sovereignty of a smaller one? Has there never been reason for denouncing more Oradours or Auschwitzes?

You know the truth: in the last twenty years, the great historical act has been the struggle of the underdeveloped nations for their freedom. The colonial empires have crumbled, and in {64} their place independent nations have grown or have reclaimed ancient and traditional independence which had been eliminated by colonialism. All this has happened in suffering, sweat and blood. A tribunal such as that of Nuremberg has become a permanent necessity. I have already said that, before the Nazi trials, war was lawless. The Nuremberg Tribunal, an ambiguous reality, was created from the highest legal principles no doubt but, at the same time, it created a precedent, the embryo of a tradition. Nobody can go back, stop what has already existed, nor, when a small and poor country is the object of aggression, prevent one from thinking back to those trials and saying to oneself: it is this very same thing that was condemned then. In this way, the hasty and incomplete measures taken and then abandoned by the Allies in 1945 have created a real gap in international affairs. We sadly lack an organization which has been created and affirmed in its permanency and universality and which has irreversibly defined its rights and duties. It is a gap which must be filled and yet which no one will fill.

There are, in fact, two sources of power for such a body. The first is the state and its institutions. However, in this period of violence most governments, if they took such an initiative, would fear that it might one day be used against them and that they would find themselves in the dock with the accused.

And then, for many, the United States is a powerful ally: who would dare ask for the resurrection of a tribunal whose first action would be to demand an inquiry on the Vietnam conflict? The other source is the people, in a revolutionary period, when institutions are changing. But, although the struggle is implacable, how could the masses, divided by frontiers, unite and impose on the various governments an institution which would be a true Court of the People?

The Russell Tribunal was born of this doubly contradictory conclusion: the judgement of Nuremberg had necessitated the existence of an institution to inquire into war crimes and, if necessary, to sit in judgement; today neither governments nor the masses are capable of forming one. We are perfectly aware that we have not been given a mandate by anyone; but we took the initiative to meet, and we also know that nobody could have given us a mandate. It is true that our Tribunal is not an institution. But, {65} it is not a substitute for any institution already in existence: it is, on the contrary, formed out of a void and for a real need. We were not recruited or invested with real powers by governments: but, as we have just seen, the investiture at Nuremberg was not enough to give the jurists unquestioned legality. . . . The Russell Tribunal believes, on the contrary, that its legality comes from both its absolute powerlessness and its universality.

We are powerless: that is the guarantee of our independence. There is nothing to help us except for the participation of the supporting committees which are, like ourselves, meetings of private individuals. As we do not represent any government or party, we cannot receive orders. We will examine the facts ‘in our souls and our consciencesÂ', as we say, or, if one prefers, in the full liberty of our spirits. None of us can state, today, how the discussions will turn out and whether we answer yes or no to the accusations, or whether we will come to a conclusion at all, perhaps deciding that the evidence, though real, is insufficiently proven. What is certain, in any case, is that our weakness, even if we are convinced by the proof brought before us, would not enable us to condemn. What can even the lightest sentence mean if we do not have the means to put it into effect? We will therefore limit ourselves, should this arise, to declaring that this or that act does in fact fall under the jurisdiction of Nuremberg, and that it is therefore a war crime and that, if the law were applied, it would be appropriate for this or that sentence to be carried out. In this case, if possible, we will name the guilty. Thus, the Russell Tribunal will have no other function in this inquiry and its conclusions, but to make everybody understand the necessity for international jurisdiction - which it has neither the means nor the ambition to replace and the essence of which would be to resuscitate the jus contra bellum, stillborn at Nuremberg, and to substitute legal, ethical laws for the law of the jungle.

From the very fact that we are simple citizens, we have been able, in coopting ourselves from all over the world, to give our Tribunal a more universal structure than that which prevailed at Nuremberg. I do not only mean that a larger number of countries is represented; from this point of view there are still many gaps. But, most of all, whilst in 1945 the Germans were represented only in the dock, or sometimes as witnesses, here {66} several members of the jury are from the USA. This means that they come from the country whose very policy is our subject and that they have, therefore, their own ways of understanding it. Whatever may be their conclusions, the intimate relation with their own country and its institutions and traditions will necessarily be reflected in this TribunalÂ's conclusions.

Whatever may be our wishes for impartiality and universality, we are very conscious that this does not legitimize our undertaking. What we would really like is that our legitimation would be in retrospect, or a posteriori. In fact we do not work for ourselves nor for our own edification, and we do not presume to impose our conclusions like a thunderbolt. In truth, we would wish, with press collaboration, to maintain constant contact between ourselves and the masses all over the world who are painfully watching the tragedy in Vietnam. We hope that they will be learning while we learn, that they will watch and understand, and come to their own conclusions. These conclusions, whatever they may be, we would wish to be reached individually and independently of those we come to ourselves. This session is a communal undertaking for which the final term should be, as a philosopher said, ‘une verité devenueÂ'. If the masses agree with our judgement, it will become truth, and we, at the very moment when we step back so that they will become the guardians and powerful supporters of that truth, will then know that we have been legitimized. When the people show their agreement they will also show a greater need: that a real ‘War Crimes TribunalÂ' be created on a permanent basis, that these crimes may be denounced and not sanctioned anywhere and at any time.

These last remarks reply to a critical comment made, without ill-feeling, in a Paris newspaper: ‘What a strange Tribunal: jurymen but no judge!Â' It is true, we are only jurymen, we have no power to condemn, nor to acquit anyone. Therefore, we are not prosecutors. There will not even be a real accusation. Maître Matarasso, President of the Legal Commission, will read you a statement of the charges registered. The jurists, at the end of the session, will have to pronounce on these statements: are they justified or not? But judges exist everywhere. It is for the peoples of the world and, in particular, the American people that we are working. {67}

Categories
All in the Mind

Is it Time to Rethink Media Effects?

It has become increasingly common in some academic circles to write off public controversies about children"s media as moral panics. This paper sets out to challenge the implied claim made in this argument that media do not have psychological and cultural impacts on children. This position confuses public concerns with public safety and children"s well being with right wing moralizing about children"s taste. It also reduces the scientific study of the relationship between violent entertainment and anti-social behaviour to a narrow hypothesis of direct causes rather than seeing it as diagnostic work on risk factors. This paper suggests that the fifty year long debate about youth violence would be better understood as a political struggle over the "lifestyle risks" rather than "entertainment values" which now pits media corporations against anxiously concerned parents.

Introduction: The Crisis of Childhood and the Roots of Media Effects Theory

The cultural impacts of technology are rarely foreseen at their inception warned Harold Innis (1951) inThe Bias of Communication, his prescient analysis of the important role that media have played throughout history. It was therefore important to distinguish the impact of any technology from the hopes and ideologies we projected upon them.1 For many years, state and church maintained monopolistic control over print technologies; yet in the long term cultural impact of the printing press could not be contained, for the accelerated diffusion of knowledge and scientific rationality precipitated by print ultimately weakened church and state authority, while gradually shifting the exercise of power into the commercialized arena of public journalism and opinion. Innis predicted that new communication technologies, like radio and TV, would similarly generate profound and seemingly paradoxical disturbances in social communication. And by undermining the very oligopoly of scientific knowledge and authority of those who currently controlled them new media often precipitated political struggles to shape their role in the modernizing world.

It is not surprising that in post-war America the introduction of television was first and foremost apprehended as the harbinger of social progress and democratization. Optimists hoped that as television diffused through America, this new medium would make cultural and scientific knowledge readily available to the coming generation. Hope was especially strong among progressive educators who believed that television"s "window unto the world" would provide the next generation with a universal access to knowledge and culture. And in many ways it did. At the vortex of a burgeoning consumer culture, television became the preferred source of entertainment and information for all sectors of the population " but especially loved by children for its up beat visual story-telling.

As the onslaught of commercialized "low brow" popular entertainments flooded the airwaves, the progressives dream of an educated citizenship dissolved into an anxious fretting about the crisis of socialization in the modern world (David Reisman, 1952). Although public controversies about socialization have been traced back to Plato"s suggestion that teaching the written word would undermine children"s memory, these debates entered the mainstream of American media during the 1950"s. Did TV provide early access to the wisdom, acting as a cultural treasury for the nation or did it produce a generation of ignorant couch potatoes? Given the crucial symbolic space that childhood occupies in western cultures, and the conflicted perspective on childrearing in America after the war, it is hardly surprising that children"s fascination with TV was viewed with both optimism and horror too, not only by social theorists, but by the public at large (Spigal 1997). The public debates about children"s mediated culture became a regularly contested zone of "social regulation" after the war, that grew ever more controversial with children"s growing enthusiasm for it.

So shortly after its introduction, children"s television became the flashpoint of a protracted political struggle over post-war values and lifestyles. At the centre of this controversy was the question of television"s impact on children. Some alarmist commentators proclaimed that a "generation gap" was dividing America, and sought easy answers to the degradation of American civic culture byblaming it all on the mass media and the rise of popular culture.(Rosenberg et al. 1954) Did not children need to be protected from exploitation in the mass mediated cultures in the same way that 19th Century advocates protected children from abuses in factories and the family? As Kirsten Drotner comments "Children and young people are prime objects of "media panics" not merely because they are often media pioneers; not merely because they challenge social and cultural power relations, nor because they symbolize ideological rifts. They are panic targets just as much because they inevitably represent experiences and emotions that are irrevocably lost to adults." (1992: 59). Television seemed to represent the unstoppable force of cultural massification that separated the lives of post-war generations from their parents.

To understand our contemporary world demanded a new way of thinking about the media"s impact on socialization argued media guru Marshall McLuhan in his profoundly confusing but prescient,Understanding Media (1961). In this Age of Anxiety McLuhan declared, the controversies over tastes and popular culture arise from the deeper disturbances created by electronic media within our social values and cultural sensibilities. Pointing out limitations in Wilbur Schramms" study of children"s use of televisionwhich found no effectsMcLuhan argued that psychologists often failed to measure the underlying processes that linked the mass media to profound traumas of our age (pg 33). In his view the debates about children"s media presaged the way children"s cultural sensibilities and values were being reconstructed in the post-literate retribalizing global village.

McLuhan clarified his most famous aphorism, the medium is the message, by explaining that theorists would fail to comprehend the changes taking place in mass society without "understanding media as environments" in which cultural dynamics contend and interact. McLuhan"s probes into media cultures suggested paradoxically, that television would both enhance and subvert the values of our literate society. This implied that the impacts of media cannot be understood independent of the social system in which they are implemented and used. Although it can be said of McLuhan that by half of what he said he meant something else, while in the other half he meant nothing at all his work made media analysis an increasingly important part of the study of socio-cultural change: writers from Postman and Toffler to Baudrillard paid tribute to McLuhan in their own prognosis for late industrial society. The study of the media"s impact is now too diverse and too contentious to summarize here. But at its centre, the debate about media saturated childhood never abated.

Against a backdrop of fifty years of public controversy concerning children"s use of violent entertainment, a group of 33 cultural studies scholars have become supporters of the video game industry in its battle against media censorship. They have dismissed the concerns of children"s advocates about media violence as just another media panic, saying there is no proof of the "effects" hypothesis. This paper examines the political and methodological issues implied in this claim that media have no psychological and cultural impact on children, suggesting that this highly politicized media controversy is proof that media have profoundly impacted not only children"s culture, but the popular discourses on and the politics of childhood.

Moral Kombat: Media Theory in the Age of Anxiety?

The introduction of television occurred at the very moment that America was in the throws of traumatic social change. The baby boom generation - the first post war TV cohort - was already regarded anxiously by the American public, preoccupied as it was, about impending moral decline, breakdown of the family, the problems of education, and rising tide of youth violence after the war. Of course war, violence and crime are issues that plague primitive and modern nations alike. All societies, must develop both legal and cultural mechanisms for control of the ever present sources of social conflict and threat of anti-social behavior. Yet there was a perplexing paradox at the heart of Americans attitudes to the use of force: As a right of self defense and guarantor of economic expansionism, Americans had long prided their military prowess, celebrating in popular culture heroic males imbued with bravado and guns.

Although crime has long been a prominent public concern in the USA throughout its history, after the second world war, rising youth crime rates placed the socialization of aggressive on the front pages. Sociologists interested in crime and antisocial behaviour in America framed violence as a generational phenomenon associated with juvenile delinquency (Becker 1961) "fearing the moral mechanisms and norms that had maintained public order in the past had been eroded in the post-war generation (Goodman 1956, Reisman 1952). As a perceived threat to law and order in our communities, aggression and crime are the lifeblood of contemporary journalism, for they manifest concretely the social forces undermining civil society ”the symptoms of a rampant sickness of an otherwise democratic culture.


The media"s growing role in the intensifying anxiety about youth delinquency and generational conflicts was itself formalized into an analysis of cultural regulation by sociologist Stanely Cohen (1972). 'Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic" he wrote. Cohen suggested that the media"s labelling of youth counter-culture movements as "deviant" was the first step in a discursive process of social control. His book drew a parallel between the hyped up media coverage of the mods and rockers and anthropological accounts of collective social phenomenon like witch hunts, inquisitions, public hangings which were also propelled into hysteria on a wave of public anxiety. His book documents a general process underlying these panics: "A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion.......;the moral barricades are manned......; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.' (Cohen 1972, 9)

Panic is the quasi- social psychological term which Cohen uses to characterize the "sudden and overwhelming fear or anxiety" which seizes public discourses. The word panic itself derives from the god Pan who the Greeks imagined unleashed the powers of irrational fear. So too, argued Cohen, public anxiety fed by news reportage which was governed more by false accusations and hysteria, than a reasoned concern with impartiality, prompted a social control discourse mobilizing an strong reaction within the justice community and those sensitive to threats to the moral order. As experts were called in to explain the threat, youth cultures were interpreted as deviant, and a threat to the whole social order..

Cohen"s media analysis of the language of panic during the mods and rockers conflicts emphasized the media"s role in both the interpretation and prompting of a broader societal reaction. The journalists didn"t create these anxiety attacks of course, but Cohen believed that media were responsible for the amplification of anxiety which led to calls to control youthful opposition to the normative order. The same he said could be said for the media coverage of youth drugs, hair styles, and rock and roll. Cohen felt this process of panic amplification amounts to a hysterical over-reaction – an "irrational" response to a magnified threat of violent disruption. Cohen was concerned that the social anxieties prompted about youth culture, was actually a new form of ideological social control of working class sub-cultures.

Cohen"s theory of moral panic was therefore picked up by British Cultural Studies as one of the pillars of their theorization of subculture as resistive movements of the working class youth. The term media panic became widely used to describe the various public over-reactions to counter-culture tastes and youth pleasures, whether it be swastikas, reggae rhythms, rap lyrics, gay lifestyles, raves or playing Carmaggedon. Cultural studies scholars imagined themselves on the side of liberating youth from the oppressive censorship of their attempts to appropriate culture. In this sense they became defenders of the youth oriented sectors of the cultural industries, arguing that violence was simply a manifestation of youths rejection of bourgeois taste.

Media Affect

Because of the seeming link between endless symbolic killings, rising crime rates, and disobedient children, academics have from the beginning of the 20th century debated the contribution of popular culture to issues like delinquency and disruptive youth behaviour. But the scholarly debates about the anti-social behavior of the television generation grew load enough that they echoed through the corridors of power: increasingly scientific researchers and psychologists were drawn into the ever expanding controversy over media effects. For example, giving testimony at the Kefauver inquiry (1954), Paul Lazarsfeld claimed, there simply wasn"t sufficient scientific research to determine the impact of TV violence on children. In the angst filled days of the cold war, more and more psychologists set out to address the question in their laboratories. Prompted by repeated instances of spectacular youth violence (the Charles Manson killings for example) the study of media violence and its effects moved out of the labs as it became the central question of media effects research. (Huston et. al. 1992) Anyone interested in this topic must now confront shelves of books, studies and reports pertinent to the impact of media on children"s learning of aggressive and anti-social behavior. This literature is not only substantial, but varied in perspective and conclusions. The majority of it, as the Psychological and Pedaediatrics Society (2001) and Surgeon General"s (2000) review all conclude, although effects are small and difficult to specify, they are significant for some children in some circumstances. Yet from the 1980"s onward, others broke rank and rejected this growing concern about television"s impact on anti-social behavior. These critics argued that the evidence of televisions impact was being blown out of proportion (McGuire 1986, Freedman 1984) It is foolish therefore, to attribute to television all the social disturbances encountered in American postmodern culture to television. (Fowles 1999). Besides which, its guns that kill people and not TV, argued Todd Gitlin (1995): so if a solution is to be found to America"s high youth homicide rates, then it should be through gun control and social welfare policy, and not through censorship.

In Britain too, in the wake of the Jamie Bulger murders, the question of media violence moved to centre stage too as psychologists anxiously pointed to television to explain the seeming crisis in contemporary childhood. Children"s advocacy groups rose up and calling once again for regulation of media violence. A group of British cultural studies scholars took offence, and reinterpreted Stanley Cohen"s account of "moral panic" to attack on the very idea that media effect children. Against the threatened censorship of children"s culture, these scholars ridiculed the abreaction of those that were "panicked" by this brutal act. They also challenged the validity of the scientific evidence which "proves" media effects, and called into question the motives of those social scientists which supports the social regulation of media violence. Their objections were to both the assumptions about well-being, and normal development implied by psychology, and to the science they used to justify it. Guy Cumberbatch for example, scoffed at the underlying moralism of these child protectors who forgot their own youthful resistances, and wrongly laid the blame on the media. He equated their claims with earlier generations of censorious prudes who have sought to protect children from the evil influences of idleness, comics, or video nasties and to sanitize children"s media. (Cumberbatch, 1993). So what if children were fascinated with mature and adult themes? The importance of popular media within children"s cultural is itself evidence that media provide a discursive zone that children recognize and talk about as their own – and wherein they meet their own needs.

David Buckingham, too asserted that not only are the anxieties misplaced, but that the effects researchers have failed to respect children" genuine quest for more varied and less conventional forms of re-creation and amusement. TV is after all only story-telling, a fantasy resource which children choose willingly, and accordingly should be a matter of "taste" and not regulation. However ribald and aggressive popular cultural products are, what children watched reflected their own values, tastes and needs. Psychological theories of media effects simply failed to understand the robustness of children"s culture he argued, or acknowledge that children are active and savvy audiences who can tell the difference between fictional violence and news, play and reality -- even if their parents can"t. (Buckingham 1997). Buckingham goes on to critique both the bourgeois elite who programmed and regulated children"s television, and media effects academics who studied it, as if children were helpless victims of the media. "Ultimately, there is a denial of children"s agency at the heart of this approach; and these criticisms apply just as much to more apparently "critical" research about the effects of advertising or consumer culture as they do to research about media violence." (2001). They advised adults to lighten up a bit, preferring to grant to children"s cultural industries more autonomy to serve their child audiences free from the invasive interference of the moralizers. At least the commercial producers didn"t talk down to them in nannyish tones of bland traditionalism.

David Buckingham also noted the cultural studies opposition to the science underlying the claims about effects:

"The media effects industry is, of course, largely driven by moral and political panics about the harmful influence of media on children. Within Cultural Studies, there is a long tradition of damning this work, not just as positivist and empiricist, but also for conceiving of children (and audiences generally) as merely passive victims of the media."

He is referring to a collection of essays edited by Barker and Petley which called for an end to the panic becausethere are no "ill effects" of media violence . The evidence that childhood is in crisis, or that TV influences aggression is weak and based on mindless positivistic effects theory that fails on close examination to demonstrate that media are to blame, they claim. Youth crime rates and violence are falling, even in the USA, as the use of computer games increases. (David Gauntlet, 2002). Based on these arguments cultural studies scholars dismiss the fifty year long study of media effects as moral panic rather than a scientific theory. They argue that a cultural studies perspective can see through the media panic by recognizing the diversity of media representations, that audiences actively seek pleasure in interpreting conflict, and especially that young people possess the ability to distinguish real violence from fictional conflict.

Barker and Petley"s book dismisses the whole effects project on the grounds that psychologists are asking the wrong questions and using the wrong methods. In so doing they assert the superiority of their culturalist perspective over those deterministic psychologists, educators and sociologists that narrowly study only the media"s effects on children. The public"s fears arise from their reactionary traditional values and not fromreal effects of media. (Barker and Petley: Ill Effects 2002). Citing scientific critiques of the effects science they argue that a varied diet of popular entertainment has never been shown to be harmful to children. So the moralizing claims of the effects brigade is not only "false and misleading" but also "daft" and "mischievous". It is false because there is "no such thing as violence in the media" which can have either harmful or beneficial effects" in the first place. Mischievous because culturalist scholars believed the "alarmism" precipitated by "effects science" contributes to public censorship of children"s culture by pumping up the anxiety of parents.

Politics of Digital Panic in America

Given evidence of children"s' avid domestic use of video games and the internet for accessing violent content -- it is not surprising that the question of the new media"s impact on youth aggression added to the growing controversy over children as "consumers /audiences/users" of media (Livingstone 2002). Especially since 1992 as fighting video games like Street Fighter, Mortal Kombat and Doom first hit the market, digital media too began to feature prominently in the public battles over children"s media saturated lives. In this changing media environment, public anxieties began shifting from the TV and films to digital entertainment. Yet in America, the media producers have long opposed encroaching government regulation: rallying under the twin flags of freedom of expression and corporate responsibility they have worked hard to mollify parental concerns. Under the threat of regulation by Congress, the video game industry protected itself by putting on the mantle of self regulation: they developed an age related code similar to that for films, and a body called the ESRB which classified games according to their violent and anti-social themes.

But the regulatory pressure returned when a particularly nasty school massacre at Jonesboro, brought the issue of media violence back to the front pages: America seemed to once again be in the throws of media panic. On the screen children"s advocates were blaming, drugs, parents, families teachers and of course video games for the rise of school shootings. Perhaps not coincidentally Jonesboro was also the place where Dr. Dave Grossman author ofOn Killing (1995) and a leading critic of violent video games had retired. Grossman had been a lieutenant colonel who had built a career figuring out how to train soldiers to kill. As a retired US army officer, Grossman seems well positioned to comment on the similarity between the tactics used in the army to train soldiers and they use of violent video games among children today. The US military has long used simulation training for its soldiers because the "repetition and desensitization" of simulated killing effects kill rates (the actual percentage of soldiers that will pull the trigger in real life combat). Recently he has become a leading US advocate of restraining the American entertainment industries arguing that "the main concern is that these violent video games are providing military quality training to children". Like the training of these soldiers, Grossman believes that violent video games may have a similar effect on young people who play them a lot, not because they create models or templates for children"s behaviour, but because they help break down the psychological barriers that prevent killing: "children don"t naturally kill; they learn it from violence in the home andâ€Ã‚¦from violence as entertainment in television, movies and interactive video games". Grossman has persuaded many Americans once again that its time to do something about the "virus of violence" infecting America resulting in renewed calls to regulate video game violence just as it had film and TV.

After Littleton, Congress was prodded by the growing public outcry to hold new hearings on media violence. Grossman expressed his strong views to the committee. So too did a number of psychologists summarized the scientific evidence proving video games were harmful. The ISDA president submitted the industries view that video games did no harm to children. In the course of these hearings Jeffrey Goldstein Funk and Anderson"s all offered their expert opinions on whether video games effects on children"s behavior have been proven.

Headed to Washington to testify too, cultural studies scholar Henry Jenkins feared that the scientific debate had turned into a right wing witch hunt mobilized by a deep fear about young people which is intensifying the surveillance and monitoring of children"s behavior. Jenkins articulated for the committee the cultural studies scholars opposition to the effects research tradition, ridiculing those researchers who study media violence in laboratories by counting how many times a child hits a bobo doll. He articulated cultural studies argument that social science was not only misleading, but exaggerated maliciously to scare the trusting public into accepting more regulation of children"s media: lambasting the social science critiques he argues that their research evidence is not strong or consistent enough to sustain their attack on the media industries. Is it not far better to recognize that the roots of aggressive behavior lie with dysfunctional families, drugs and impoverished communities, more than media violence.

Jenkins rejects the simplistic media effects model arguing that rather than harm, media provide children with a rich cultural "resource" that they explore and interpret in their own way. Moreover, it is wrong to expect the imaginary worlds of children"s media to conform to parental ideas about morality and order. And in a society traumatized by rapid social change parents had been gulled into panic by the coalition of right wing moralizers and effects psychology: "Suddenly, we are finding ourselves in a national witch hunt to determine which form of popular culture is to blame for the mass murders and video games seemed like a better candidate than most" he says. Jenkins rebuffs the growing hysteria about video game violence arguing: "We are afraid of our children. We are afraid of their reactions to digital media. And we suddenly can"t avoid either". Eliminating violence from the screens will have absolutely no impact on aggressive and antisocial behavior he argued.

Welcome to the Risk Society

Afraid of our children or for them? In the 1970"s, the growing awareness of unforeseen social and environmental disruptions associated with post-industrial life generated a growing sense of crisis. Ulrich Beck"s theorization of the "risk society" made the emerging politics of anxiety into a critical sociology of modernization. Beck"s critique exposed both the complexity of the global environmental crisis and the limits of contemporary sciences to deal with the new technological risks produced by modernization. Anthony Giddens (1994) added to Beck"s critique of state and corporate mandated sciences, the obvious corollary that the market had become the paramount system for distributing both well-being and risks. Giddens' account of the politics of risk therefore highlights the problems of identity construction and life management that confront contemporary consumers. In the risk society, science is not just narrowly politicized but essential to the whole citizenry of modernizing nations for their survival. In the shadow of terrorism, tormented by global strife, plagued by a post-bubble economic recession and facing a burgeoning environmental crisis, the understanding of risk sciences have become essential to ordinary citizens pondering the complex tradeoffs they must make between the anticipated social benefits and threatened perils associated with the modern ways of life. The crisis of modernity, therefore is also witnessed in the public anxiety and confusion as consumer-citizens are required to manage their daily lives in the face of increasingly complex scientific discourses on risks and benefits of contemporary lifestyles.

In the context of this theory of a risk society, moral panics about youth violence appear to be only one of the many modernization anxieties. Anxiety pervades most aspects of youth lifestyle choice from fast food to pokemon – leaving parents hard pressed to do their best for their children in an increasingly complex world. Unfortunately, those interested in risk society are only beginning to pay attention to the role that mass media play in the politics of anxiety within risk society (Ferudi 1997). Cohen"s theory of moral panic can therefore be read as an instructive case study of the role that media play in the political dynamics of the risk society. Cohen"s account highlights the medias role in the distribution of information, in the sensitization of public opinion, in the dynamics of attribution of cause and blame, and their consequences for social control of the threat. As Cohen"s case study so clearly illustrated media do play an important role in setting the moral agenda and mobilizing the publics reactions to youthful disruption of social order. It is ironic therefore that the critics deny evidence of media effects – and in so doing ignore the journalisms role in the amplification of media panics.

Given journalisms position within the commercial media system it is hardly surprising that dramatic news stories involving sex, violence and crime feature prominently in our media. (Sorenson, S. B., Peterson Manz, J. G., Berk, R. A. (1998).2 These researchers investigated the degree to which newspaper stories about homicide correspond to actual patterns of homicide victimization" finding that "although homicide constitutes the least common form of crime, it receives the largest share of television and newspaper coverage of crime" (p. 1510). In another recent study, Maguire, B., Weatherby, G. A., & Mathers, R. A. (2002)3 suggest that "that news coverage of crime tends to be driven by the tenet, "If it bleeds, it leads" and that media coverage of news is characterized by a "herd mentality."

Close examination of the coverage of journalistic coverage of youth violence in America, indicate that the anxieties may arise from sensationalistic news values, more than it does from the balanced accounts of crime. For example Dorfman, L., Woodruff, K., Chavez, V., & Wallack, L. (1997).4undertook a content analysis of 214 hours of local television news from California. They found that for 1721 stories that violence dominated local television news coverage of youth, that over half of the stories on youth involved violence, while more than two thirds of the violence stories concerned youth. The episodic coverage of violence was five times more frequent than thematic coverage, which means that references to any links to broader social factors, or causes including media, are rare.

Although I think they wrongly blame the mischievous "effects researchers" for precipitating the media panic, these culturalist critics have raised a number of interesting questions about the role of media in the public perception of risks to children. So do these scientific discourses actually galvanize the media into a frenzy? It is hard for me to believe in the light of those content analysis of violence news that the scientific debates about media violence play much of a role in the panic coverage, other than consolidating already established opinion of the journalists.Have the journalists covered the scientific debates fairly? As Murray (2001) suggests, rather than feeding a media panic, American news reporting of the scientific findingshave consistently understated the evidence of risks. Perhaps because the media industry has something at stake, or perhaps because they apply a simplistic and non-scientific understanding of research evidence which fails to contextualize it, they often air on the side of caution when reporting science and sensationalism when reporting crime. If so perhaps the cultural studies scholars should be putting the blame for panic on the shoulders of the journalists and not the effects researchers.

So does this overblown news coverage scare parents into blaming the media? It is fair to say that many parents are troubled by their children"s use of media. Lets face it, parents have always been worried about their kids: we are raising our children in a risk society after all.Do they blame media more now than before? I doubt it. Surveys show that many parents agree that media are partly to blame for violence in society (65%): Yet, the percentage of parents that think media are the main cause is as low as 10%. So the public seems sensible in this case: they believe that media may be one of the contributing factors in the socialization of aggression, but certainly not the only one. Moreover, they have more than media to ground their anxieties: From our interviews conducted with mothers of young boys, I found their concerns about "boy culture" are based both on ideology and experience of childrearing as much as news. (Kline 2000) As parents watched their children using popular media in the nursery schools and fantasy play at home , many became convinced that TV and video games did contributed to some children"s aggression, and particularly to the problems their youngsters experienced in the playgrounds. So do kids. Recent surveys show they too believe that media are addictive, harmful to some, and that their younger siblings should not be exposed to sex and violence. (Kline 2001)

In fact, in the introduction to a later edition of his book Cohen (1987) rejected the appropriation of his study of moral panic by cultural studies to counter all concerns about violence and anti-social behaviour among youth. These scholars, he felt, were in danger of reducing his complex discussion of class conflict to matters of taste and style. It"s original intent was simply to de-legitimate the interpretation of working class youth movements as deviations from bourgeois norms and to reveal how reactionary forces mobilized around media panics in response to them. Cohen was aware that media panic mobilized all social agencies with a stake in the youth culture issues: some progressive and some less so. He noted that the public struggle over youth violence and anti-social behaviour, increasingly aligned the cultural industries with youth counter culture movements that used their products: This is what Cohen refers to as the exploitation of panic – which in his mind included both the justice system and the commercial enterprises that can profit from youth subcultures who began to assert their own interests. And Cohen was right: for nowhere is this mobilization more in evidence than in the media industries: Faced with public outcry industry representatives have increasingly intervened at the public hearings, in community enquiries, in the courts, in the legislatures and the scientific arena"s – where-ever the effects of violent media were being debated.

Disciplinary Powers: Panic Theory Goes to Court

An example is the contested St. Louis ordinance which would restrict the sale of violent video games to children.5 A similar ordinance had been successfully defeated in Minneapolis when the ISDA convinced the judge to declare that since violence has been part of children"s literature throughout history that it "would not only be quixotic, but deforming to shield children from the very graphic violence in new media like television and video games." Needless to say, the ISDA intervened again in St. Louis to prevent legislated restrictions on the sale of video games to children there. What is different in this instance, is that the ISDA have now been willingly assisted by some academic friends of the court “ including prominent cultural studies scholars Henry Jenkins, Jib Fowles, Todd Gitlin, and David Buckingham“ who have taken up the cudgel against a local community whose elected officials are trying to place legal restrictions on the sale of violent and horrific media products to children (to whom the industry itself claims not to be selling them).

These Amici curiae acknowledge that "the relationship between entertainment and human behavior is multi-faced and complex". But in their brief, they protest that the St. Louis County Council"s Ordinance implicitly relied on simplistic "assumption that video games containing graphic violence cause violent behavior". Their submission is intended therefore to "assist the court in understanding the media effects debate" because they fear that the courts have unwittingly succumbed to the "commonly held but mistaken beliefs about a proven causative link between violent entertainment and violent behavior to uphold a censorship law." In what follows I want to contest the cultural studies scholars completerefusal of the proof offered by the media effects scientists.

Proof

It remains unclear to what extent the Minnesota judge ruled against this so-calledcensorship ordinance on the assumption of proof of harmful effects of video games. Yet the Amici worry that the St. Louis court will believe that the "effects hypothesis" is proven on the basis of Dr. Craig Anderson"s testimony of the scientific evidence. Anderson "s review summarized both his own views, as well as the scientific opinion expressed by other psychologists and sociologists who have been researching media effects for fifty years both in the laboratory and in the field (Anderson and Bushman Murray, Paik and Comstock etc.). The OED states that a modern science is " a branch of study which is concerned either with a connected body of demonstrated truths or with observed facts systematically classified and more or less colligated by being brought under general laws and which includes trust worthy methods for the discovery of new truths within its own domain" OED. This definition rightly describes science as a discursive social body of knowledge which is methodologically disciplined by two specific rules of evidence. The first rule concerns empiricism: the hypotheses must be demonstrated by gathering and evaluating evidence. The second criteria is that science establishes "trustworthy methods" to ensure that evidence can be agreed upon by the community of scientists who evaluate each others findings (Schroder et al. Forthcoming). In this sense a science never proves anything. The evaluation of scientific evidence always hinges on the rejection of a "null hypothesis" represented by the proposition that there are "no effects". One never proves significant effects, but rather finds reasons to reject the no-effects proposition. A science therefore is nothing more than a self-regulating debate among scientists about the best explanation of observed events. But in a risk society, science politics is governed by what Tinsdale calls the Panglossian principle: Unless it can be categorically demonstrated that something is wrong, we will assume that all is well" which means that "the burden of proof is with those trying to prove that there is a risk" (1998:59) This imposes legal rules of evidence on scientific debate, that current practice of risk is assumed innocent until proven guilty. It may be a small point, but by overlooking this fundamental epistemological point the Amici are revealing their deep hostility the scientific method and its underlying procedures for discussing the weight of evidence.

The Amici"s submission contends that the weight of evidence has not supported the assumption of a causal relationship. They do so by citing scientific views of psychologists like Kevin Durkin, Mallory Wober, Jeffrey Goldstein, Mark Griffith and Jonathon Freedman which in their view suggest that experimental studies have not in fact proved "adverse effects" from playing video games; that the positive results are small, that the measures of aggression used are "dubious", and that ultimately the effects researchers have failed to prove that violent entertainment "causes – or is even a risk factor for actual violent behavior".

Questioning the Evidence

The Amici are right when they call into question the validity of psychological research into the relationship between media violence and aggression / anti-social behavior. Although trained as a psychologist I too find this literature both confusing and frustrating to read because of the very different ways its key constructs, "media violence" and "aggressive behavior", have been defined and operationalized. Does watching a killing mean the same thing when it is situated within a cartoon, a news story or a horror video? Does aggressive behaviors refer to hitting and fighting, to bullying verbal taunts, to feelings of hostility, or to our moral attitudes expectations and responses in social situations of power? Moreover the design of laboratory experiments with a 10 minute exposure to a violent scene or studies of undergraduates in lecture halls are particularly suspect as explorations of these complex processes.

Goldstein (1999) maintains that all these studies show is that boys enjoy playing in and watching action adventure fantasies. Since male aggression is so deeply embedded in contemporary culture, correlations are best explained by the tendency of those predisposed to aggression watching more violent TV. Unless experiments show consistently, that after watching or playing a violent programme or playing a murderous video game (the stimulus), a significant number of children jump up and kick or hit another child (the response), the researchers cannot claim there is an effect on behavior. Since many experiments in the effects literature are faulted, there is no reliable evidence to prove the causal hypothesis over and above this male fascination (Goldstein 2002).

Insofar as Goldstein is pointing out the inconsistent frameworks, dubious findings and methodological short-comings of the behavioral psychology literature on video gaming, particularly the experimental studies conducted in labs on space invaders, I can only agree with his doubts : many of the video game studies are so badly designed that one wonders why they are still being discussed. Goldstein also criticizes the research for only showing that video games at most, influence the way children talk and play: Since boys are also more likely to engage in both playful and hurtful aggression it cannot be claimed that video games cause that behavior. But can lab experiments ever find evidence that by changing the way children play media contribute indirectly to their aggressive attitudes and actions.

Yet the Amici intimate that most reviewers of the video game literature agree with Durkin, Wober and Goldstein that there is no evidence of effects in the video game research reviews. My own reading of Griffiths (1999) review is rather different than the Amici"s. Like Goldstein, he is of course scathing about the design and measurement issues plaguing the video game literature: "all the published studies on video game violence have methodological problems and that they only include possible short-term measures of aggressive consequences". Griffith is concerned about lumping together cartoon like violence and more realistic games (as in TV shows) and also between games where conflict is competitive hostility (sports or racing) as opposed to aggressive contest (fighting, shooting). There is therefore "a need for a general taxonomy of video games as it could be the case that particular games have very positive effects while other types are not so positive". I totally agree: of the 25 or so studies, at least half are out of date: experimental comparisons of playing Space Invaders for 10 minutes can provide no insight into the consequences of playing Soldier of Fortune for 10 hours a week in the course of one year. (Kline 2001)

Yet Griffith goes on to say that "one consistent finding is that the majority of the studies on very young children – as opposed to those in their teens upwards-tend to show that children do become more aggressive after either playing or watching a violent video game" when the research observes children"s "free play". Although there are too few studies to saywith confidence how much video games contribute to aggressive play and antisocial behaviours in the long run. (1999: 210) Which is why Griffith concludes his review: "the question of whether video games promote aggressiveness cannot be answered at the present because the available literature is relatively sparse and conflicting, and there are many different types of video games which probably have different effects". That is entirely reasonable given the dearth of studies. First person shooter games and those which feature extremely graphic violence (Soldier of Fortune) have not been around long enough for longitudinal research, to have properly identified the risks to very young children associated with playing them regularly over the years.

Yet Griffith has been convinced that video games can have both positive and negative consequences for children"s learning: "If care is taken in the design, and if games are put in the right context, they have the potential to be used as training aids in classrooms and therapeutic settings, and to provide skills in psychomotor coordination in simulations of real life events, for example, training recruits for the armed forces". (1999) In short he believes their effectiveness as learning environments has been demonstrated, but not precisely enough to specify the consequences of playing a particular game on different kinds of children. Pace David Grossman. Isn"t that exactly what he is saying. And is that what Anderson means when he suggests that"video games provide a complete learning environment for aggression".Maybe in another 20 years we will have the proof that video games supplement TV as environments for learning aggressive attitudes and weapons skills, but should legislation await the proof of specific harms done by specific games? In most risk controversies, we adopt the precautionary principle. Do we only ban a drug after its side effects have killed someone?

Whose Hypothesis?

Because their submission relies so heavily on Jonathon Freedman"s (2002) recent book length review of the media effects literature I will discuss it at length. Freedman argues forcefully both that the amount of research has been exaggerated and that the evidence proving effects has been overstated. His arguments are substantial, complex and methodologically cautious. In their reviews, both Freedman and Goldstein acknowledge that there is adequate evidence to say that relationship exists between preferences for violent entertainment and aggression. This relationship they say at best explains 10% of the variance of aggressive behavior. But they don"t accept that there is proof that video games do any harm. Both maintain that without experimental proof, correlations found in the literature tell us "absolutely" nothing about causal relations.

Freedman, like Goldstein is psychologist who is familiar with the enormous difficulties and expense of good psychological research. Yet I still have deep concerns about the way Freedman evaluates the weight of scientific evidence about the relationship between violent entertainment and anti-social behaviour. Having just read much of this literature, I disagree with the criteria for proof he establishes, the kinds of evidence he excludes, and the way he accounts for each studies relative contribution to understanding the relationship between violent entertainment and aggression .

Firstly Freedman assumes that there is only one kind of proof of the causal hypothesis namely that children watching more violent entertainment should be predisposed to acting aggressively. Although the question of direct stimulation or imitation of violent media did dominate the research paradigm early on, the thinking in this field abandoned behaviorism for a more complex social learning approach during the 1960"s. In fact, I can"t think of many researchers who have pursued such a simplistic version of the causal hypothesis , at least since Bandura"s bobo doll experiments. This is what I object to most in this assessment of proof: Freedman"s imposition of behaviorist criteria of a direct causal relationship between media representations and aggressive behaviors as the benchmark.

Most contemporary psychologists do not theorize aggression as a direct imitation of the programme but as a learned social behavior that becomes enacted by individuals in different situations which have implicit rules and sanctions. Psychologists know that there are many things besides media which also contribute to children"s learning about conflict and the role of aggression in social relations. Personal experience, peer relations, identification with role models, intelligence, sex roles, and parenting styles are obviously important factors in the development of social skills and aggressive dispositions. The propensity to act aggressively therefore will vary across individuals depending on their experience and circumstances, their peer relations, and communities. But many also believe that media representations of conflict and interpersonal aggression can make a contribution to the cumulative formation of those mental constructs and representations which prevent or privilege aggressive behavior. What is learned from media will depend on children"s interest in, patterns of use, identification with and interpretation of the violent narratives.

Unfortunately, Freedman ignores the actual hypotheses of investigators like Bandura, Stein and Huessman and evaluates their conclusions according to his own simplistic causal hypothesis. For example his behaviorist criteria leads him to dismiss all evidence of intervening and interacting processes involved in the medias role in the development of aggression. He is particularly derisive of the experimental Bobo doll studies because he claims that hitting one is "not a measure of real aggression". So he dismisses all studies which show watching violence can influence either their social preferences for toys, to their attitudes or play. But if watching WWF leads some boys or girls to play more aggressively, and if, peer groups that engage in aggressive play establish norms that accept bullying and teasing, then it seems reasonable to study play as an intervening variable. Freedman would say that this study provides no evidence for a direct causal relationship.

Their interest in the mechanisms of learning lead many researchers to use indirect measures of the effects of violent programming. Take for example, Bandura"s (1963) study. Is it correct to read this as a test of the causal hypothesis that media violence causes aggression , or as Bandura proposes, as a study of the mechanisms of observational learning through which children imitate adult models, whether they are on television or not. As he points out peer aggression is not that frequent; and certainly less likely in adult supervised situations like the nursery school environments these studies were conducted . It makes sense to use a measure that reflects the learning rather than the aggression. Hitting of the Bobo doll is never interpreted by Bandura as a measure of aggression per se. Rather the hitting of Bobo indicates the degree to which the child, having observed the particular pattern of modeled behavior, incorporate that behavioral construct into their play routines.

Secondly, in doing so Freedman dismisses all arguments about intervening or mitigating variables moderating psychologists expectations of universal effects of violent entertainment on all children. We know aggressive and anti-social behavior is not distributed equally in populations, differing between genders, between classes, and educational levels. Aggression and crime rates vary depending upon the family background, peer experience and community the child grows up in. It is not far fetched to think that media use interacts with these situational sociological factors such as family regulation of media use, in contributing to the learning of aggressive and anti-social behaviour in children and youth.In longitudinal field research it is especially important to control for these interaction effects because we have evidence that family background, preferences, interests and social circumstance which shape both the preferential patterns of TV viewing and potentially contribute to the media"s impact on at risk children.

Although Freedman acknowledges that naturalistic experiments and longitudinal research should provide some of the most convincing evidence of effects, his simplistic reading of their results finds they don"t. But this conclusion depends on how you add up the weight of evidence: For example, he sometimes tallies each condition in the research design asa separate test of the behavioral hypothesis, as if all research is designed to prove whether media violence directly causes aggressive behaviors in all children in all situations. Knowing that real aggression is a rare event in the nursery school, Stein and Freidrich (1973) decided to observe the gamut of aggressive behaviour including threats, taunts and playful tussling as well as hitting as indicators of the differential learning from a diet of violent, neutral and pro-social programmes. Freedman counts this classic study as two failures because the researchers failed to demonstrate a significant difference on the behavioral level between both neutral and pro-social treatments and aggressive behavior. It"s a bit more complex than that.

It does take a rather complex analysis to tease out the mechanisms involved in the children"s differential assimilation of these three media diets which is why this study is regarded as a classic. But does Stein and Freidrich"s finding that it is only once we control for aggressive predisposition and preferences for violent or anti-social media at home that we can understand the aggression, lead us to reject or refine the effects hypothesis. I certainly wouldn"t discard this "hypothesis" when so many studies reveal that TV can effect children"s learning as registered in children"s language and play. Nor is it insignificant to find that the effects of the cartoon aggression diet are only found in boys once we control for aggressive predisposition and what they watch at home as well. The reason these researcher constructed three treatments and employed multiple measures was not because they expect every one to be different, but rather to help them explore the various mechanisms of learning mediating the acquisition of social behavior including cooperation as well as conflict. As Stein and Freidrich explain, children"s intelligence and aggressive dispositions, their family backgrounds and ways of orienting to television, as well as the children"s social skills all interact with patterned media use, and its expected effects.

For example, Freedman also argues that Milavsky" et. als longitudinal study which revealed that preferences for violent programming in childhood predicted subsequent aggressive behavior can"t be included as evidence. He rejects this finding by pointing out that a preference for violent media is not the same as exposure to it. Unless you measure actual exposure (stimulus) the evidence must be doubted. So if the study provides some evidence of some other intervening factors, he considers it as lessening the weight of empirical evidence. This is like arguing that preferences for cigarettes don"t kill people only cigarettes can. Yet enjoying cigarettes is part of the process of developing a patterned use of cigarettes, an aspect and indicator of the psychological process that contributes ultimately to higher rates of cancer. There will be some people who once smoked , liked to smoke , but no longer do, who might respond to a questionnaire that they have a preference for cigarettes, but this is hardly reason to discard sound evidence of a relationship between preferences and health outcomes. Moreover, in the case of both cigarettes and violent entertainment the fact that some forms a strong preference for the activity, implying enjoyment and pleasure, might be an important difference in the pattern of use. For example the smoker who enjoys a cigarette may take deeper guilt free puffs, and the boy who plays Duke Nukem, may enjoy the sexist connotations in ways that a girl doesn't.

Although Freedman agrees that field studies have provided the most interesting evidence concerning the effects hypothesis: Yet by ignoring explanations based on intervening variables, he has discounted much of what we know about television as a learning environment for aggression. For example, he discounts Heusmann"s (1986) finding about identification with violent heroes because it is not uniformly related to subsequent increases in aggression scores for all subjects in all nations. Not only are the findings weak and inconsistent for genders he argues, but also the results from Holland and Finland failed to produce the same increasing correlations as the American results, and only for girls.

I have some knowledge of the kinds of programs that the American kids saw, but little of the kinds of violent programmes broadcast or family practices of Holland, Finland, Poland or even Israel to watch with the same frequency and duration please let me know. It is not unreasonable to suspect that developing preferences for violent programmes with action hero characters, might be part of a patterned use of violent entertainment that can contribute to the socialization of aggressive and antisocial children, in some cases. The evidence from these longitudinal studies is modest but not vanishingly so. Given the range of circumstances children grow up in, the differences in their preferences, and the variety of mitigating factors, if what children identify with violent heroes at 6 predicts any anti-social behavior at 15 in America -- even marginally, I think it is reasonable to read it as a rejection of the null hypothesis.

And until I am confident of that their experiences were similar, I would not reject the US finding, because the European lack thereof. I suspect the results of cross national studies might now be different given the presence of American programming in the global television market. Take for example Grobel's (2000) recent finding that 13 year old boys across Europe develop strong preferences of action hero programmes. Unfortunately, because longitudinal studies are expensive we are only beginning to understand o how these various intervening variables contribute to children"s social development – both positive and negative.

Not all of the psychological accounts of media effects expect young people to commit aggressive acts immediately after watching. Media can contribute to that process both directly impacting attitudes and by interacting with other risk factors experienced within peer groups, schools, families, communities. Mitigating factors in this socialization of aggression range from family modeling and regulation to laws and public advocacy programmes. This is why most effects researchers do not expect every single child will be influenced by media violence in the same way. For example, the desensitization hypothesis implies that the more children watch, the less violence disturbs them. Habituation and desensitization may well explain why as some children grow up they become bored with violent games. Or alternatively why they seek out more aggressive fantasy experiences to overcome that boredom. Displacement theories imply that the harm to children may derive from what they give up in order to watch , such as healthy social play and reading.

Some of these hypotheses seem tangential to the behaviorist insistence that after playing games children should feel more hostile or act more violently. Yet psychologists understand that these factors constitute developmental assets which may help children cope with ever present media violence. Garbarino for example has noted that once the researcher accounts for these "developmental assets" the media"s influence becomes clearer. Among asset-rich children the rate of violence is low while among asset-poor children the rate is high. "Assets are found throughout the social ecology of the child” family, school, neighborhood, and community. The rate of demonstrating significant violence is 6% for kids with 31 to 40 assets bracket, 16% for those with 21 to 30, 35% for those with 11 to 20, and 61% for those with 0 to 10. Risk and opportunity accumulate." Which is why, he says "an accumulation-of-risk model is essential if we are to understand where televised violence fits into the learning and demonstration of aggressive behavior." Aggressive individuals or those who experience abusive, or brutal family and peer relations may develop a preference for violent entertainment, which in turn confirms templates of human relations which reinforces their understanding of conflict in their lives. Other families monitor, limit and co-view media, exerting a moderating influence over the way children use and interpret media. It all depends. Rather than the causal hypothesis, the driving force behind the psychological research enterprise is To determine what it all depends onbecause accounting for mitigating factors may help us understand why, heavy consumers of violent entertainment do not always grow up to be aggressive and anti-social.

Thirdly, and most problematically Freedman"s review exclusively deals with studies of TV violence and aggressive behavior. Dill and Dill observe that many of the problems in the video game literature arise from limited theorization of the differences between video game play and television watching. Although video game use patterns vary they are not chaotic or unpatterned. But surveys reveal that more so than television, boys are different than girls in their preferences, use and pleasures derived from game play. Boys not surprisingly prefer violent games and value elements that make games violent more. (Kline 1998)The preference for violent video game play is related to the amount of overall time spent and the preference for video gaming as a leisure activity. These heavy players are more likely to have game machines in their rooms, and to be less supervised in their game play.

These are some of the reasons we should not use Freedman "s judgment of limited effects review to the evaluate the learning from video games. Although I believe there are important similarities between these screen media, there is as Bandura (1986) speculates , also good reason to believe that the learning mechanisms invoked by video games will be stronger than with TV:

interactive nature of video games may increase the learning of game playing behaviours, including aggression, especially considering the move towards real-life action and actors in the newer generation of video games. This increasing realism might encourage greater identification with characters and more imitation of the behaviours of video game models.

Dill and Dill also note, as cultural studies scholars have insisted, that the active participation of video game play -- where players choose and then manipulate characters from first person point of view, may accentuate their identification with the characters and narrative: "Identification with the video game character may be stronger than identification with television or movie characters, in part because players choose a character and play the characters role in the video game scenario" (1998: 413). For this reason desensitization effects may be accentuated: "Empathy has been found to be low among known aggressors than non-aggressive and the degree that plots justify the aggression "if violent video games depicts victims as deserving attacks and if these video games tend to portray other humans as targets then reduced empathy is likely to be a consequence of violent video game play".

And finally, I believe that Freedman"s review has passed its best by date: Although it was published in 2002 he provides no account of empirical studies of media and aggression after 1992. It is too bad that Freedman has not kept up with the research literature when he claims that once other factors have been considered in those longitudinal studies, the variance explained by violent media preferences is negligible. ? For example, in a recent longitudinal study published inSciencethis year and undertaken in the USA, Johnson et al. (2002) report that even after controlling for other factors known to contribute to aggressiveness in young people"like childhood neglect, growing up in an unsafe neighborhood, low family income, low parental education and psychiatric disorders" there remain"significant associations between television viewing during early adolescence and subsequent aggressive acts against other persons" later in life. Their data show for example that young boys who watch more television are particularly at risk for aggressive behavior media: whereas 45% of the boys who watched television more than 3 hours per day at age 14, subsequently committed aggressive acts involving others, only 8.9%, who watched television less than an hour a day were aggressive later in life.

So too, in Daniel Anderson et al."s recent reporting of their recontact study, the two teams found " a much stronger support for content-based hypotheses "â€Ã‚¦ Viewing educational programs as preschoolers was associated with higher grades, reading more books, placing more value on achievement, greater creativity and less aggression. These associations were more consistent for boys than for girls. By contrast, the girls who were more frequent preschool viewers of violent programs had lower grades than those who were infrequent viewers." (pg vii) Using sophisticated statistical techniques the researchers found that when they controlled for an intervening variable called television focus (defined by the degree to which children talk about violence and use television themes in their play) there were strongly significant differences between correlations for viewing preferences at age five for violent programmes and aggression during their teens. Those with low television focus had negative -.12 correlations while those medium and high focus had +.24 correlations. Again evidence not of simple direct effects, but of an growing understanding of how children"s patterns of media use can influence their social behaviors.

This brings me to the crux of a perspectival paradox buried in the Amici Curiae"s submission. In their submission the Amici draw attention to both fact that media consumption is a voluntary behavior, and that playing violent games is much enjoyed by young people. This is why they see the legislation as censorship of children"s pleasure. Children are especially active audiences with interactive media, they claim, which is why their media use cannot be understood as a passive assimilation of contents: Children know that video games are simply environments for playful exploration of a sometimes difficult "adult" world. Moreover children"s play, and game play especially is a very complex learning process because it is imaginary: we can "t assume children make literal sense of the violence in their video games. They choose to watch horror films or play video games for many reasons including the potential to fantasize "empowerment" and transgression" and to experience "intensified emotions" or reinforce "ideological" understandings of the grown up world (Buckingham 2001).

All of these arguments are valid; but when the Amici go on to assert that the effects research has not acknowledged them, I must disagree. These cultural studies scholars have in the past ridiculed quantitative effects research for its positivism and failure to appreciate the complexities of children"s relationship to the media. Their underlying objections to quantitative evidence is that "effects are much more diverse and difficult to quantify than believers in the causal hypothesis generally acknowledge". Yet it is not the effects tradition which has been "driven" by a unproven "causal hypothesis" but the cultural critics who read the media effects literature through the lens of the causal hypothesis who see children as only "passive victims" of mediated entertainment.

Every media analyst is acquainted with the complexity of studying the relationships between entertainment and human behavior: So why utilize simplistic behaviorist critiques to call into question the evidence these researchers have gathered that leads them to believe that media can contribute to aggressive and anti-social behavior. This is why I find it so curious that these scholars have relied on the opinions of behavioral psychologists like Goldstein and Freedman, whose industry supported readings of the accumulated evidence are purposive. Freedman and Goldstein are reviewers with a political agenda: both are self confessed "hired guns" who are supported by industry for their reviews of the video game literature. I propose the Amici actually read this literature themselves, for I believe they will find that some of these researchers have thought deeply about how children learn while using media, and report their conclusions honestly.

Cause for Concern: Researching Determinacy in a Complex Social World

The Amici accept this interpretation but have antipathy to the use of probability statistics in the empirical sciences: "significant" they argue does not mean "important". It means simply "not likely to happen by chance." I think it is unfortunate therefore that in their rush to condemn all quantitative research that they fail to distinguish between the use of inferential statistics to prove cause s in laboratories and its use to identify risk factors in studying the effects of media in populations. of the effects literature without understanding the .

I have suggested that it is a learning model not a causal model which drives this field of research. The theories of learning proposed by both the medical and psychological associations suggest that video games can be a risk factor, if a not a cause, which in addition to and interacting with many other factors contributes to socialization (Huesmann 1997). This is why the Amici"s elision of the difference between the causal hypothesis and risk analysis is fundamentally mistaken. The causal hypothesis of the behaviorists critics, and the theories of social learning of risky behaviors employed by the psychologists are radically different conceptions of determinacy in social behaviour: In the history of science this difference is akin to those between biology and ecology in the natural sciences, between a mechanical Newtonian physics and systems quantum science. Underlying both is the rejection of Aristotelian notions of isolatable and necessary precursors of a subsequent effect, to be replaced by a multi-dimensional and probabilistic account of mutually interacting systems of dynamic relationships between variables. It is for this reason that the Surgeon General's (2000) asserts that media violence can be viewed as a risk factor in youth aggression. The report summarized the controversial evidence concerning the media's contribution to youth aggression in the following way:

"Research to date justifies sustained efforts to curb the adverse effects of media violence on youths. Although our knowledge is incomplete, it is sufficient to develop a coherent public health approach to violence prevention that builds upon what is known, even as more research is under way. Unlike earlier Federal research reports on media violence and youth (National Institute of Mental Health, 1982; U.S. Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior, 1972), this discussion takes place within a broader examination of the causes and prevention of youth violence. This context is vital. It permits media violence to be regarded as one of many complex influences on the behavior of America's children and young people. It also suggests that multilayered solutions are needed to address aggressive and violent behavior."

Risk analysis does not assume that there is one singular and overriding effect. Nor are all of the expected mechanisms related directly to media content. A growing body of research has suggested that an array of psychological mechanisms (social learning, mean world, desensitization, role modeling) are involved in the socialization of aggression. So to the indirect effects of having other kinds of activities displaced (homework, reading for pleasure, social play) and by becoming habitually linked to unhealthy lifestyle practices (eating while watching, inactive pleasures) are widely accepted.

The process of learning to be aggressive and antisocial, involves the development of attitudes and emotional responses to social situations over the course of a lifetime: In the course of daily life it is reasonable to hypothesize that both violent content influences aggressive attitudes and predisposition to aggression can contribute to the preference for violent entertainment. What matters in the long run is whether the patterned use of media contributes to their attitudes to aggressive and anti-social behavior. This is why the video game industry is often compared with the Tobacco industry for promoting a risky behavior. Murray as well as Anderson (refs.) , have suggested that the "risks" associated with violent media use approach those which link smoking to lung cancer: that would mean that 10-20% of teen anti-social behavior can be attributed to their television viewing. Freedman"s estimates are closer to 10% of the variance explained and I support his estimates. Yet remember, those are estimates for the whole population. The correlations are higher for some "at risk" populations“ that is children growing up poor, in abusive homes , hanging with aggressive peers and growing up in high crime neighbourhoods.

In epidemiological science the relationship between two variables “ for example watching television and obesity -- is established empirically by careful analysis of interacting risks. Since not all smokers get lung cancer, nor do all heavy consumers of violent media become instant killers, these relationships are represented statistically in terms of the probabilities of their concurrence. The statistical tools for assessment of risk are correlation, covariance and regression analysis. In epidemiological research a correlation with a risk indicates that a variable might be a risk factor. It does not matter whether the smoking cause d the cancer, or that those predisposed to cancer smoked more. Nor does it matter that medical science has not yet established exactly which of the chemicals in the smoke actually precipitates the disease process or why individuals predisposed to cancer, smoke. Yet to scientists, the assessment of risks is an important step in the developing a better understanding of the mechanisms of risk reduction. (Hill 1965) For example an analysis of the Youth Risk Behaviour Surveillance data for 2001 show that heavy viewers of TV are 7% more likely to get in a fight during the prior 30 days, than light viewers. The same survey estimates that 33 % get in fights during a year, so when used to estimate the implications of a determinant relationship for a population the size of America, a 7% of the difference implies that hundreds of thousands of children could be put at risk of bullying and teasing from television.

    % of US population under 20 = 30%

    size of youth and child population = 30% x 276 million = 82 million

    33 % of teens reported getting fights in 2001 = 27,324,000 fights in America each year.

    7% difference implies that in the order of 1,912,000 fights that might be attributed to heavy television viewing.

Risk analysis acknowledges that media use, like cigarette smoking and wearing of seat belts is a matter of lifestyle choices that become patterned in the course of development. Contributing factors can be explored by comparing the correlations between media use and aggression within specific populations such as boys and girls. If there is evidence that more boys who regularly play violent games are also more likely to be anti-social and aggressive than a comparable population of then media can be said to constitute a lifestyle risk to children in the same way that starting to smoke does. Because viewing is voluntary, does not imply it is risk free. In the face of similar evidence the cigarette companies have demanded definitive proof of a causal mechanism too, in courts where they defend their right to sell this "legal" product. Their insistence on proof of a direct causal relationships in both cases is at odds with scientific judgment of the multiple and mutually interacting risks of aggression that children encounter in the course of their lives.

Children use and interpret video games in different ways. We know that boys , far more than girls are likely to play them regularly, and also to develop stronger preferences for violent games. Moreover, their video game play will itself be sanctioned and negotiated differentially within families, within communities, and within cultures. Perhaps boys identify more with powerful characters, with situations of power and conquest, or perhaps they become habituated to or catharcized by repeated acts of killing. It all depends on a variety of psychological and social forces than can be identified statistically. So why worry about the absolute proof of a generalized causal mechanism if we have strong evidence suggesting particular children will be influenced more by playing violent video games. Acknowledging this, risk analysis suggests that we don"t need to worry about each and every child “ only the ones that put themselves at risk because of their particular interest in and preference for violent video games.

The Amici suggest that since harm has not been proven, that we can expectno positive outcomes from the regulation of media. Yet risk analysis of media use has helped us focus on the many things in children"s lives which can moderate the impact of a steady diet of aggressive entertainment. The risk approach suggests that a better understanding of their distribution provides new insights into the possibility of mitigating those risks associated with heavy media consumption. This has been nicely illustrated by two recent field experiments undertaken at Stanford by Robinson and colleagues which demonstrated that reducing young children"s overall exposure to media (TV and video games) can have very positive effects on their health and aggressive behavior. Robinson points out that correlational evidence indicates that avid TV viewers, especially girls, are at risk of obesity and boys of violence. It is true that these correlations don"t tell us whether aggressive and fat children watch more TV, or whether heavy TV viewers fight and eat more and exercise less. But since we are interested in reducing obesity and anti-social behavior it is possible to test these directional relationships by reducing the risks associated with heavy TV viewing.

Applying Bandura"s social learning models, Robinson reasons that reducing children"s media exposure could lessen their identification with aggressive heroes and reduce their enactments of domination scripts in their playground interactions. In the case of obesity three media related mechanisms have been found in the literature: First that children substitute watching TV for more active play; second that in watching more TV children will be exposed to more snack and fast food advertisements; and third, that children develop a particular habit of eating while they watch. Robinson developed a schools based programme for reducing that risk through media education program. At the test school researchers found children in the media risk reduction intervention had reduced their TV viewing by about one-third. They also found that after six months the weight gain in the treatment schools was significantly lower. Moreover, based on ratings of playground aggression, frequencies of bullying and rough and tumble play were about 25 percent lower in the treatment school, than those at the control school.

Conclusion: Rethinking Panic Culture?

Peter Horsfield (1997) has pointed out, the idea of media panic, is now also "invoked by those in positions of power in society and in situations where it doesn"t apply, in order to discount and defuse legitimate challenges to their power" and interests. The Amici curiae are a group of international cultural studies scholars who as "friends of the court" believe that"efforts to address real–world violence by censoring entertainment are profoundly misguided." I highlight this point because it seems to me that the Amici"s intervention is more about the politics of free speech than it is about understanding the role played by media in the socialization of aggression. The Amici are intervening on the side of an industry which has lobbied hard for more than 10 years to resist having any kind of legislation imposed on the promotion, sale and distribution of digital entertainment, against the general drift of American popular opinion. They have put their names, and their scholarly reputations behind the ISDA"s controversial legal claim that any legislation attempting to deal with marketing and sale violent entertainment to children is tantamount to censorship. Unfortunately they never discuss why they think censorship of children"s culture by parents is wrong: And so the cultural studies attack on media effects researchers ends up being political intervention based on challenging the views, and the motives, of effects scientists.

I am not a lawyer nor am I familiar with the St. Louis ordinances exact provisions. Yet from their defense it is clear to me, that like the V-chip, the ratings legislation seeks to consolidate the parental "filtering" of all media in accordance with generally held community standards, rather like a net nanny. Ratings place restrictions on the sale of only those video games which are not intended for, and are deemed inappropriate for children of an age by the industry itself. When, the ISDA funded the rating of these games as 17+ under the ESRB did they not implicitly accept that there are social values and community standards pertaining to all media (TV and Films); that some parents have concerns about the risks associated with video games because they felt they were unsuitable for children. As the ESRB web site claims, these ratings are advisories intended to help parents make appropriate choices for their children: ""We want to make sure that parents and consumers have the tools that they need to monitor which computer and video games their children play," said Dr. Arthur Prober, President of the ESRB." When parents check the rating, the control is in their hands - right where it should be." Since the legislation does not put a ban the sale of video games outright, the legislation hardly merits being called censorship. It is not draconian in its spirit or its intent. Its intent is to help parents prevent their children"s inadvertent exposure to violent, sexual and terrifying experiences. So why is it, that in every jurisdiction that begins to enforce stronger media regulations, the media industry"s P.R. flacks intervene? In the political struggles over children"s entertainment cultural studies has become aligned with an industry which insists any ordinance controlling the children"s marketplace is a censorship law, rather than an aid to families trying to raise their children in difficult circumstances.

These politics of media censorship in America are part of a much broader struggle over what that society considers good or harmful for its children in market society, and who has what rights to communicate with them. I am aware that media panic can be used to promote zero tolerance. But I am also wary of pathologizing American parents and educators for their concern about youth violence. To some degree there is evidence that the gun panic, though not changing the constitution, has to some degree pacified the schools, where the number of weapons and frequency of fighting seems to be falling given the zero tolerance policies. Yet it is also important to remember that the political struggles over youth aggression, are complex and different, in Canada , Britain Sweden and France. In the States freedom of speech and of the press has become equated with freedom for corporations to dominant public discourse. The point I am making is simple, legal and political: the administration of ratings everywhere, including the U.S.A, is generally regarded as a legitimate and helpful mechanism for market regulation designed to maintain community standards and values. This judge in St. Louis felt that the state should play a role in cultural markets by assisting parents to be effective guardians – perhaps so that they don"t have to engage in constant surveillance of their children.

It is true that we don"t know very much about how video game violence will impact children"s culture in the long run. But certainly the optimists are wrong: like television, video games have not brought about a new age of enlightenment. The evidence seems to show, that some children who play them intensely over a long period of time may be more predisposed to aggressiveness in their play preferences and social interactions. They also give up sports and social interaction to play them. They may also less likely to be fit, to sleep less, and often do worse at school because of the time they spend playing them and not doing their homework. Perhaps we shouldn't be panicked. But neither should we deny the possibility that they provide learning experiences to the children that play them“ some that we sanction and celebrate and others that we don't. The media effects controversy therefore, is not so much about whether there are effects, but how we evaluate them.

War and Peace in the Hallowed Halls

Cultural historians like Brian Sutton Smith have reminded us that both aggressive play and gruesome folktales have long been a facet of children"s culture. This is obvious. But does that mean nothing has changed when the video game industry has developed games which accentuate brutal retribution and justifies the use of force which can be experienced as entertainment “ as fun -- by those that choose to play them. Does the longevity of conflict in life and art mean that new media have not altered the environments of story telling, the quantity and brutality of conflicts" representation, and thus contribute to what and how children learn while using them?

The cultural studies scholars have voiced their strong challenge to researchers who claim that media can influence what children learn while playing with video games. Having slogged through this research I am left wondering why cultural studies scholars have declared war on media psychology. Under the banner of media panic they have dismissed its claims, and questioned their motives. Their strongest words are directed against psychological researchers who have tried to gather evidence about what children learn. These cultural critics have public ally condemned these effects psychologists in the courts of America as both false and mischievous because they believe scientific research fans the flames of public anxiety. They advocate an end the censorship of children"s culture, granting total freedom to the media industries get on with their business of entertaining children without reference to community standards. In so doing they have exposed the fundamental disciplinary and epistemological divides that separate these two ways of thinking about media.

I have tried to point out that in respect to method, that the discourses of science are differentiated from other ways of apprehending of our world -- intuition, journalism, divine inspiration, common sense and risk panic -- all of which it is sometimes at odds. As Michele Foucault has so ably noted all sciences are social discourses of knowledge embedded in the struggles over social power in a politicized world. As Foucault concludes: "In societies like ours, the 'political economy' of truth is ¦centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement. Pg. 131-132.Yet as he goes on to suggest it is " the problem does not consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or truth, and that which comes under some other category, but in seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourse which in themselves are neither true nor false. " pg. 118. This is because a science in our modern lexicon subsumes a self-critical discursive practice -- that is, a social body of experts or specialists who research and debate the results of their investigations. In the twentieth century the sciences emerged as a critical social enterprise whose method of inquiry and its epistemology established careful rules of evidence for argument.

During the twentieth century as our interest in researching public communication grew, the methods of studying communication diverged: on one side, stood the hermeneutic traditions of arts and humanities who interpreted texts in isolation. On the other, stood the social sciences, especially developing in North America, who emphasized the generalizable effects of mass-mediated content. Raymond Williams was worried by this ever-widening divide in post WW II communication studies between social scientific and humanities communities. Media studies especially the study of audiences, he argued, was being bifurcated by these epistemological and methodological rifts.

I believe Williams fully understood the fundamental differences underlying the theories, interests, research methods and philosophies in the divergent streams of communication studies. The humanities had evolved its critical "interpretive" approach from methods of the exegesis of texts which emphasized the insightful interpretive analysis of specific cultural artifacts, and from the detailed historical analysis of documentary evidence situated in specific socio-historical contexts. These scholars contributed "sustained and detailed analysis of actual cultural works" he argued, but "what was much more open to question was the extension of this kind of analysis and insight to matters of cultural and social generalization." The social scientists on their part, seemed to Williams to be reductionist and a-historical in the general laws, structures and impacts of communication processes they espoused. American social sciences were especially steeped in quantitative behaviorism and operationalism, all too often narrowing their empirical inquiry to questions which were easily "observable" rather than critical challenges to prevailing ideology. Each epistemological community tended to police its disciplinary boundaries more vociferously, avoiding dialogue about complementary methods, or fundamentally misunderstanding the dialectical logic at the heart of qualitative and quantitative methods.

Yet Williams worried that culturalist approach had become naively opposed to the social science method. They also stopped taking the idea of determinacy seriously. Williams himself refused to reject completely the value of the American "effects research tradition, indeed stated clearly that he found much of it "useful". His proposal of a hybrid discipline called "cultural science" was based on his hope that by entering into a dialogue there would be a healing of the epistemic fissures in communication research. He believed that it would only be through such a dialogue that this new discipline would be able to keep social structure and "determinacy" relationships in full view while acknowledging the 'agency' of audiences that chose to use and consume them.

Beneath the epistemic divide between cultural studies and psychology however, lie divergent valorizations of childhood itself. Cultural studies has documented the resourceful child who always copes with what the market offers. Concerned with the problem of well being, the psychologists documented the vulnerable child, at ever greater risk in our risk society. Both of these perspectives are important ways of thinking about the situation of the media saturated childhood. I share Williams dream of a unified cultural science, but fear that his "politics of hope" has been forgotten in the disciplinary struggle over how we should interpret the media risks in America and Europe.






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